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JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN:




This article is the response of a lawyer who represents chil-
dren charged with crimes in juvenile court to those who call for
the abolition of the juvenile court' and for placing increased
criminal responsibility upon delinquent youth.2 I argue that the
. Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Director, Northwestern
University Legal Clinic, Children & FamilyJustice Center. This article is dedicated to
the memory of Dr. Derek Miller, former Director of the Adolescent Treatment Pro-
gram of Northwestern Memorial Hospital, who cared deeply about the children I rep-
resented and whom he made whole. I thank Steven Drizin, Diane Geraghty, and
Bernardine Dohrn for their helpful comments and Will Rhee for his editorial and re-
search assistance.
ISee Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997); Jonathan Simon, Law and
the Postmodern Mind: Power Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Post-Modem Society, 16
CARDozo L. REv. 1363 (1995); Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Recon-
structing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083
(1991); Katherine H. Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preser-
vation of Children's Legal Rights, 16J. CoNTMp. L. 23 (1990); Stephen Wizner & Mary E
Keller, The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obso-
lete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1120 (1977); Martin Guggenheim, A Call to Abolish the Juvenile
Justice System, CHILDREN'S RTS. REP.,June 1978, at 1, 3. Guggenheim has subsequently
reversed his position. See Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Re-
sponse to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 163 n.1.
'During the last 10 years, states have increasingly turned to criminalization as a re-
sponse to the perception that criminal behavior among juveniles, particularly violent
behavior, has increased dramatically. See Donna Lyons, Juvenile Crime and Justice: State
Enactments, 1995, 20 ST. LEGIS. REP. 17 (1995) (50-state survey); Barry Feld, TheJuve-
nile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes,
7 8J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987); Wendy Kaminer, Crime and Community, THE
ATLANTic, May 1994, at 116; Alex Kotlowitz, Their Crimes Don't Make Them Adults, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 40. At the time of the writing of this article,
there is a federal bill, the "Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997," that
has already passed the House of Representatives and awaits Senate vote that encour-
ages: (1) incarcerating children with adults; (2) transferring more children to adult
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juvenile court and the juvenile justice system (including com-
munity-based support programs for children and families)
should be retained after being reinvigorated with both financial
and human resources.3 These investments will allow the juve-
nile courts to perform credibly-even when dealing with the
relatively few "serious" or "violent" offenders who now pass
through our juvenile justice system.
I make this argument because I see daily the tragic impact
of the criminalization of the juvenile court and referral of my
clients to criminal court and believe that this trend does not
serve victims or society at-large. The acts of a very few children
and their access to guns drive the campaign for "get tough"
measures which include increased transfer of youth to criminal
court and, tragically, the marginalization of juvenile courts.4 In
criminal court; and (3) increasing the criminalization ofjuvenile status offenses (i.e.,
truancy). The bill, if passed, would link $500 million of federal funding for states to
programs that adopt such provisions (not a single dollar of this amount would be
used for prevention). S. 10, 105th Congress (Oct. 9, 1997). This legislative move-
ment is reflective of popular perception. See, e.g., Robert B. Acton, Youth, Family And
The Law: Defining Rights And Establishing Recognition: Gubernatorial Initiatives and Rheto-
ric ofJuvenile Justice Reform, 5J.L. & POL'Y 277 (1996) (examines governors' "initiatives
and rhetoric" and finds that governors who speak out on juvenile justice issues over-
whelmingly favor measures designed to send a "get tough" message); S.V. Meddis,
Poll: Treat Juveniles the Same as Adult Offenders, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 1993, at Al (73%
of adults surveyed agreed thatjuveniles accused of violent crimes should be treated as
adults).
" Rather than maintaining the status quo of juvenile courts or abolishing them,
some states have completely modified their juvenile court systems. New Mexico and
Minnesota provide the two most notable examples of such reforms. At the heart of
these reforms are "blended sentencing" provisions which permitjuvenile courtjudges
to impose juvenile and adult sentences at the same time. "Blended sentencing" is de-
signed to reduce reliance upon automatic and discretionary transfer, allowing the
"transfer" decision to be made after a child's experience with juvenile court interven-
tions can be evaluated. The effect of a latent adult sentence provides incentives for
the juvenile to respond to services provided by thejuvenile court and protects society
if the child does not respond to juvenile court interventions. Blended sentencing
schemes impose substantial punishment, provide incentives for rehabilitation, and
where rehabilitation works, eliminate the economic and social costs of long-term in-
carceration in adult institutions. See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO
SERuous AND ViOLENTJuvENLE GCRimE 55-56 (1996).
'When all relevant variables are taken into account, including degree of participa-
tion in homicides, in 1992, 1330 juveniles were convicted of murder, 940 were princi-
pally responsible for a homicide, 290 were principally responsible for a homicide of a
stranger, and 80 were responsible for a homicide and were younger than 14 years-of-
age. Eric R. Lotke, Youth Homicide: Keeping Perspective on How Many Children Kill 31
VAL U. L. REv. 395 (1997). Franklin Zimring referred to the dramatic gun-fueled in-
crease in homicides among 14 to 17-year-olds between 1985-1992 as follows: "The ex-
treme contrast between gun and non-gun homicide trends suggests that there is more
change in weapons at work since 1985 than any essential change in the population."
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the course of representing the increasingly young children who
find themselves in jeopardy of becoming defendants in criminal
court,5 I learn about their experiences and about what has
brought them to this tragic point. I do not claim that this per-
spective is unique or that it should be the only perspective con-
sidered in this debate. But it is an important perspective that
has heretofore carried relatively little weight.6
My perspective is informed by practice in the Juvenile Court
of Cook County, and so admittedly some of the lessons I have
learned and the conclusions I draw may be parochial. I leave it
to the readers with knowledge of other juvenile court systems to
judge whether my conclusions resonate with theirs.
I begin with an attempt to contextualize my observations
and conclusions by describing a case which places in focus the
competing interests and tensions involved in deciding whether
children should be tried in juvenile or criminal court. I then
Franklin Zimring, Juvenile Violence in Policy Context, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 419, 423 (1997).
"Get tough" policies often shift the focus away from enlightened and "tough" preven-
tion programs. See, e.g., David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High
Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 449 (1997) (describing the
Boston Gun Project).
" From fiscal years (FY) 1984 to 1987, juveniles under the age of 15 accounted for
an average of 22% of the total number of juveniles incarcerated in the Illinois De-
partment of Corrections. By FY 1996, this percentage increased to 28%. ILrNoIs
CRIM. JuST. INFO. AUTH., TRENDS AND IssuEs 1997, 173 (1997). The number ofjuve-
niles transferred to adult criminal court in Illinois has skyrocketed since 1992. In Illi-
nois outside of Cook County, between 1982 to 1992, juveniles were transferred at an
average of 65 a year. In 1995, that number was 233. Id. at 174. Cf Report Shows
Youngest Account for Drop in Juvenile Violent Crime, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 12, 1996, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library (Attorney General Janet Reno announced juvenile
violent crime arrest rates dropped 4% in 1995, the first drop since 1987).
6 The proof of this is the trend toward imposing harsher criminal sanctions on
youthful offenders and trying more children in criminal court. For example, when I
began practicing law in 1970, the only mechanism for transferring children to crimi-
nal court was the discretionary transfer hearing. Minors aged 13 to 15 charged with
serious offenses were entitled to a discretionary hearing in juvenile court to deter-
mine whether they will be tried in criminal court. Since then, Illinois has repeatedly
amended its Juvenile Court Act to require that more children-initially those over 15
charged with serious felonies such as murder, armed robbery, and rape-be auto-
matically transferred to juvenile court. Illinois also has had an "automatic transfer"
statute since 1982 and a "presumptive transfer" statute since 1995. The "automatic
transfer" statute requires that juveniles charged with violent felonies, such as first de-
gree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or armed robbery, are automatically
prosecuted in adult court. It was first upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in People
v. fS., 469 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. 1984). The "presumptive transfer" statute requires that
once probable cause has been established for a serious Class X felony, the burden
then shifts to the minor-respondent to rebut the presumption that the child be trans-
ferred. 705 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 405/5-4(3.3) (a) (West 1997).
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describe and address the uncertainties which cause many to
question whether juvenile courts have a future. Next, I discuss
the reasons for believing that juvenile courts can and should be
revitalized to address the concerns of critics and why our adult
criminal justice system will not "do justice" to children. Finally,
I articulate an admittedly imprecise vision of what juvenile
courts of the future might look like, taking into account present
failures, successes, and new challenges. I argue that the best
ideas for revitalization of the court to meet new challenges are
most likely to come from the lawyers who represent children.
B. ACASE
In an effort to make my arguments and my perspective
more concrete, let me describe a composite of the increasingly
typical case seen in the clinical program at the Northwestern




The neighborhood is gang-controlled. The gang's major
source of income comes from the sale of drugs. The gang has a
hierarchy. The bottom rung is occupied by the ten to twelve-
year-olds, including my client, who do the bidding of older
members of the gang. My client's biological family consists of
his mother and several siblings. An older gang member, age
twenty-one, engages my client to sell drugs. An occupant of a
large apartment building, outside of which drugs are being sold,
calls the police to report the drug dealing. The drug trade is
The following case is a composite of my experiences in representing children
charged with serious crimes in juvenile court. It is a "story." In addition to the con-
ventional analytical tools of common law, statutory, and statistical analysis, feminism
and critical race theory have contributed the technique of legal storytelling to legal
jurisprudence. Legal storytelling attempts to counterbalance the sometimes mislead-
ing cold abstractions of statistics and sweeping generalizations with specific legal an-
ecdotes. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE LJ. 2007
(1991); Richard Delgado, Stoytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87
MscH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MscH. L. REv. 2320 (1989). Other juvenile defense practitioners
have told the stories of their clients. SeeJEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN
CHILD PROTECrEVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTIcAL DIMENSIONS (1997) (contain-
ing "stories" of child and adult clients to contextualize lawyer-client interactions);
Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Heroism and Adult Power in
Juvenile Justice, 1996 WIs. L. REv. 495, 500; Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing Older:
On Kids and Crime, 36 B.C. L. REV. 953 (1995).
1997] 193
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temporarily disrupted. The older gang member tells one of his
younger "employees" to burn the building down. Late one eve-
ning, a fire starts in the building. An elderly woman dies of
smoke inhalation. Other occupants of the building are injured
as they attempt to flee the burning building. The person who
complained about the gang's drug selling says that she thinks
she sees my client coming out of her building just before the
fire started.
2. My Client
My client is thirteen-years-old. He is charged with murder
of the elderly woman who died in the fire. The State wants to try
him as an adult. He is the smallest person I have ever repre-
sented. When he sits up straight at counsel table in juvenile
court, his chin rests on the surface of the table. His I.Q. is 54.
He reads at a third grade level. His record contains eight prior
"station adjustments"8 and three referrals to juvenile court-all
occurring within the last eighteen months. At the time of this
incident he was on probation for criminal damage to property.
He seems to have little comprehension of what is going on
around him in court. When he was placed on probation six
months ago, the juvenile court judge who sentenced him or-
dered the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
to find him a residential placement. He was sent home to await
placement. No placement was found. The DCFS worker was
looking for a placement when my client was arrested for the
murder. The only assistance or guidance he received during the
four months he spent at home waiting for placement were two
counseling sessions.
The client's narrative of his family history and of his alleged
involvement in the crime is difficult to obtain and to organize.
He lacks the ability to recount these "stories" spontaneously and
accurately. Much work needs to be done by his legal team to
gather information from him and from the members of his fam-
ily. Social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists are enlisted
to help develop a family history and to identify educational defi-
cits and emotional and psychiatric needs.
' In Illinois, a "station adjustment" is a documented verbal warning a juvenile re-
ceives at a police station without being officially charged for a crime. See People v.
Clark, 518 N.E.2d 138, 141-42 (Ill. 1987).
194 [Vol. 88
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The work of the lawyer, social worker, psychologist, and psy-
chiatrist team reveals that our client is heavily gang-involved,
primarily as a result of the gang allegiance of his older brother.
Our client is failing in school. He attends school infrequently.
His mother is a single parent who is unemployed. She is chal-
lenged by the task of nurturing and supporting her two sons
and three daughters, all under age seventeen.
3. The Courtroom
The courtroom is in the Juvenile Court of Cook County, a
building which contains not only the sixteen delinquency
courts, but also the sixteen neglect and abuse courts as well. In
addition, the building houses the Cook County Juvenile Tem-
porary Detention Center, where children in custody pending
trial are held. While waiting trial in the Detention Center, they
attend school, some for the first sustained period in their lives.
They are also well fed. There are no adults facing criminal
charges housed with the children in the TemporaryJuvenile De-
tention Center. The Detention Center is, however, overcrowded
with almost a third more children there than it is licensed to ac-
commodate.
In the courtroom during the hearing are my client, my col-
leagues and law students on the defense team, the judge, the
prosecutor, the probation officer, and the victim's family. With
the victim's family is a witness advocate from the prosecutor's of-
fice. The victim's family occupies the first row of seats. My cli-
ent's family sits behind the victim's family. My client sits
between his lawyers at counsel table.
If you were to approach counsel table from the rear as you
enter the courtroom, you would be struck by the comparison in
size between his two lawyers, whose bodies are both below and
above the table, and my client, who, except for his head, is be-
low the table. My client doodles on a legal pad while the testi-
mony is presented. He is not listening. He nudges his lawyers
when he has drawn something of which he is particularly proud.
4. The Evidence
A police officer testifies that my client admitted to him that
he acted as a "lookout" while other youngsters went into the
building. The police officer cannot recall if my client said any-
thing that supports the prosecution's contention that my client
1997]
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played a part in the scheme to set the fire. The judge rules that
the state has made a showing that a grand jury would probably
indict.9 The state presents a probation officer and a psychiatrist
who describe the child's history and mental status. Neither the
probation officer nor the psychiatrist recommend transfer to
criminal court. We present a psychologist who has diagnosed
our client as having a conduct disorder with adolescent onset, 0
the significance of which, our witness contends, is that my client
is a good candidate for treatment interventions.
All of the witnesses agree that my client will probably be re-
habilitated within the seven years that he would be required to
spend in the Juvenile Division of the Department of Corrections
if he were to be convicted of murder in the juvenile court. We
call the DCFS worker responsible for finding a placement for
our client. He testifies that indeed no treatment or services
were provided. Closing arguments are given.
My colleagues and I leave the courtroom convinced that our
client has understood little about the nature and purpose of the
proceedings that he has just witnessed. He understands even
less about the momentous decision that the juvenile court judge
is about to make about his future. His lack of comprehension
persists despite our repeated efforts to explain to him the sig-
nificance of the transfer hearing.
Why begin this article with an example from the real world
of community, courts, and practice? Because the example
9 The Illinois Juvenile Court Act's discretionary transfer statute, applicable to chil-
dren under the age of 15 charged with serious felonies, requires the juvenile court
judge to consider eight factors when deciding whether a child should be tried as an
adult: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence on which a grand jury may be expected
to return an indictment; (2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was
committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (3) the age of the minor, (4)
the previous history of the minor; (5) whether there are facilities particularly avail-
able to the Juvenile Court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the minor; (6)
whether the best interest of the minor and the security of the public may require that
the minor continue in custody or under supervision for a period extending beyond
his minority; (7) whether the minor possessed a deadly weapon when committing the
alleged offense; and (8) whether the alleged offense is a felony offense under Section
5 of the Cannabis Control Act, P.A. 89-362, § 5, committed while in a school. 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-4(3) (b) (i-viii) (West 1997).
'0 Psychiatrists and psychologists make the distinction between a conduct disorder
with childhood onset (before age 10) and adolescent onset (post age 10). See IV
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
85-90 (1994). Early onset conduct disorder is deemed difficult to treat. Adolescent
conduct disorder is less difficult to treat. Id. See generally ALAN E. KAZDIN, CONDUCT
DISORDERS IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE (2d ed. 1995).
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places in perspective the dilemmas involved in charting the
course of the future ofjustice for children. Without taking into
account such examples, we are unlikely to fashion solutions
which respond to realities. What is the level of the moral re-
sponsibility of my client? To what extent should we take into ac-
count factors such as the capacity of his family to nurture him,
his subservience to older gang members, and his low intellectual
functioning? Can the juvenile justice system "rehabilitate" my
client so that, assuming he is now "dangerous," he will no longer
be so when released? What kind of justice system holds the
most promise for supporting my client's development as an ado-
lescent while at the same time protecting society?
C. THE PROBLEMS
As a practitioner in juvenile court, and as one who follows
the public perception of juvenile courts in the media," I know
that the future ofjuvenile courts is in jeopardy now just as it was
only a few years after it was created, and just as it has been
throughout its history. Reasons for the uncertainties regarding
the future of juvenile courts the are same as those which gave
our ancestors pause shortly after the court was founded: (1) lack
of consensus about the definition and viability of the juvenile
court's mission;12 (2) concerns about the capabilities of those
working within the juvenile justice system to produce results;13
(3) under-funding and/or inefficient use of funds by juvenile
courts and associated agencies;14 and (4) lack of confidence in
the effectiveness of interventions designed to turn children away
from delinquent conduct.15
" See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, With Juvenile Courts in Chaos, Critics Propose Their Demise,
N.Y. TIM:ES, July 21, 1997, at Al.
12 A recent publication, David A. Price & Craig Boersema, The Juvenile Court at
100: Challenges and Opportunities (Findings from a National Survey) (Aug. 20,
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), noted that only 43% ofjuvenile
courts had mission statements, 27% reported that they had vision statements, and
28% said that they had policy statements.
" Interestingly, Price and Boersma found that their respondents (judges, court
administrators, prosecutors, defense counsel, probation and court services adminis-
trators) thought that people were at the same time the greatest strength and second
greatest weakness ofjuvenile courts. Judges were rated as the juvenile courts' greatest
strength. Id. at 5-7.
" Respondents to the study conducted by Price and Boersma indicated that the
single greatest weakness of the juvenile court was funding. Id. at 7.
," Butterfield, supra note 11, at Al.
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These concerns have paralyzed juvenile courts. This paraly-
sis has taken the form of demoralization, adherence to old
models out of defensiveness, and consequent failure to articu-
late new visions. Moreover, although there are positive re-
sponses to each of the four criticisms of the juvenile system set
forth above, those answers have not received the same degree of
attention that the criticisms have received. A positive, rather
than a defensive, approach to reinvigorating juvenile courts may
hold the key.
1. Mission
The controversial aspect of the juvenile court's mission 16 in
today's political and social context is the extent to which juve-
16 Pending juvenile justice legislation in Illinois (as of the date of this article, it
awaits the Governor's signature) makes clear that treatment and rehabilitation should
no longer be the first objectives of juvenile justice policy. Illinois' existing Juvenile
Court Act provides that its purpose is:
[t]o secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in
his or her own home, as will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; to preserve and
strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him or her from
the custody of his or her parents only when his or her welfare or safety or the
protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and,
when the minor is removed from his or her own family, to secure for him or her
custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should
be given by his or her parents, and in cases where it should and can properly be
done to place the minor in a family by legal adoption or otherwise.
705 IiL. CoMp. STAT. § 405/1-2 (West 1997). The proposed Act provides:
(1) It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice
system capable of dealing with the problem ofjuvenile delinquency, a system that
will protect the community, impose accountability for violations of law and equip
juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and productively. To ef-
fectuate this intent, the General Assembly declares the following to be important
purposes of this Article:
(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime.
(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly accountable for his or her acts.
(c) To provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudi-
cated delinquent juvenile, in order to rehabilitate and to prevent further delin-
quent behavior through the development of competency in the juvenile
offender. As used in this Section, "competency" means the development of edu-
cational, vocational, social, emotional and basic life skills which enable a minor
to mature into a productive member of society.
To provide due process, as required by the Constitution of the United
States and the State of Illinois, through which each juvenile offender and all
other interested parties are assured fair hearings at which legal rights are recog-
nized and enforced.
1997 S.B. 363 (SN), 90th Gen. Assembly (Ill. 1998).
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nile courts should attempt to adjudicate and dispose of cases in-
volving youth who commit serious crimes. What kind of juvenile
crime and what kinds of children can juvenile courts effectively
manage? A narrow vision of a juvenile court's role is that it ex-
ists to address the problems of non-serious offenders; indeed,
this was probably the objective of the original juvenile court.
The narrow vision, need not of course be narrow. By focusing
on relatively less serious offenders, the court may be able to of-
fer more services to youth at risk to prevent them from becom-
ing serious offenders.
A more expansive vision would have juvenile courts adjudi-
cating, prescribing interventions, and/or incarcerating both
non-serious and serious juvenile offenders. Some argue that the
juvenile court will not survive if it takes on the challenge and
the "heat" of attempting to deal with older children who com-
mit serious crimes. This is so because there is a widely held pub-
lic perception that in these cases there is great risk that
"treatment" will not work and because the punitive sanctions
available to juvenile courts are simply not severe enough to sat-
isfy societal norms of punishment.' Given the risk that juvenile
courts will "fail" when dealing with the "serious" or "violent" of-
fender, it would be better, some juvenile court preservationists
argue, not to subject juvenile courts to this risk of public con-
demnation.1
'
7 As Gittens observes:
It was really not the intention of the founders of the court to deal with children
who had committed very serious crimes; rather they were concerned about the
broad range of children held in adult jails for deeds that were more a result of
poverty, cultural misunderstandings, or childish misjudgment than of criminal
intent.
JOAN GITrENS, POOR RELATIONS, THE CHILDREN OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 1818-1990,
109 (1994). See also David S. Tannenhaus, Policing The Child: Juvenile Justice In
Chicago, 1870-1925, 111 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago)
(on file with author) ("in 1882 the Home of Corrections held I eight-year-old, 5 nine-
year-olds, 14 ten-year-olds, 25 eleven-year-olds, 47 twelve-year-olds, 68 thirteen-year-
olds, and 103 fourteen-year-olds") (citation omitted).
,SeeTORBETETAL., supra note 3.
For an excellent case study of one state's attempt to resolve this dilemma, see Su-
san A. Bums, Is Ohio Juvenile Justice Still Serving Its Purpose? 29 AKRON L. REv. 335
(1996).
[S]ome [Ohio] court officials recognize that the system accomplishes its goals
with those offenders it was designed to serve. If the juvenile system continues to
allow these repeat violent offenders to stay within its confines, it is only depleting
its time, energy, and resources, and neglecting those it was designed to serve, the
first-time non-violent child that made a mistake.
Id. at 368.
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Both the less expansive vision and the most expansive vi-
sion fail to take into account a number of creative solutions that
permit both rehabilitation and lengthy incarceration if treat-
ment fails or is impossible.20 These solutions would permit us to
retain the "best of both worlds" by maintaining incentives for
rehabilitation, yet ensuring as best as possible the protection of
the public.2 1 The experience of those states which have experi-
20 See, e.g., Barry Feld, Violent Youth Crime and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile
Justice Law Reform, 79 U. MINN. L. REv. 965 (1995); Mary W. Utton, From Diversity to
Unanimity, the Case of the New Mexico Children's Code, 8 PERsP. 6 (1994).
2' The U.S. Supreme Court made the famous comment that the juvenile court may
offer children the "worst of both worlds" in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56
(1966):
There is much evidence that some juvenile courts.. lack the personnel, facili-
ties and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a par-
ens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law violation.
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for chil-
dren.
Indeed, the historical performance of the Cook County Juvenile Court has been
proof of the Supreme Court's observation in Kent. Despite the high aspirations of the
founders of the juvenile court movement and the dedication of many who have
worked there, the Juvenile Court of Cook County has, during its history, repeatedly
failed to meet expectations. Only 13 years after its founding, the juvenile court was
criticized in a report. See CITIZENS' INVESTIGATING COMM., ILL., REPORT OF A
COMMITTEE APPOINTED UNDER RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COOK
COUNTY 1 (1912) [hereinafter CITIZENS INVESTIGATING COMM.]. This report criticized
the administration of the Cook CountyJuvenile Court for its ties to the "political ma-
chine" and "for the mistreatment of children committed to the Industrial School," id.
at 3, for political appointment of probation officers, id. at 30-42, and for the poor op-
eration of its Detention Home, id. at 42-43. The 1912 Report also noted with respect
to the operation of the juvenile court that a "crowded calendar means delay in hear-
ing cases" but that an increase in juvenile court judges from one to three was not the
answer: "the Committee feels that the peculiar duties of the juvenile court judge de-
mand a degree of specialization which would be more difficult to secure with three
judges than with one." Id. at 29.
In 1963, the Juvenile Court of Cook County was again the subject of a Citizens'
Committee Report, as well as a report by the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency. GITTENS, supra note 17, at 146. The Citizens' Committee Report noted that
although the Cook County Juvenile Court was the first in the world to be established,
it had fallen behind those in other metropolitan areas: "Knowledgeable persons have
watched other metropolitan centers take advantage of new learning to improve their
juvenile courts in various ways. In Illinois, where statutory expression was given in
1899 to a new philosophy of judicial help for the youthful offender, our juvenile
courts have received little attention." REPORT OF THE CITIZENS' COMMITEE ON THE
JUVENILE COURT 11 (1963).
A report making similar findings about the Cook CountyJuvenile Court was issued
by the Chicago Bar Association in 1989. REPORT OF THE CHIcAGO BAR ASSOCIATION ON
THEJUVENILE COURT OF COOK COUNTY 1 (1989). In 1993, the Illinois Supreme Court
Special Commission on the Administration of Justice issued a report that cited high
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mented with various combinations of juvenile and adult sanc-
tions and programs should be evaluated.
2. People
A mission statement is important. But from this practitio-
ner's perspective, people are the key. It is the work and deci-
sion-making of the people who interact with children who
determine the quality of fact finding, the thorough exploration
of dispositional alternatives, and the performance of treatment
and correctional agencies. This will be true in any system that
we design, although good people can be burdened to such an
extent that even the most highly motivated throw up their
hands or become demoralized. Unless the juvenile courts can
identify and train good people and support their work in ways
which provide them with incentives to continue, juvenile justice
systems will not realize their potential.
I am not a personnel specialist. I have not studied the hir-
ing, promotion, and termination practices of juvenile courts. I
have not studied organizational behavior. But I have been go-
ing to the Juvenile Court of Cook County once or twice a week
for the last twenty-eight years. Based on this experience, I con-
cede it would be difficult to remain a highly motivated full-time
employee in that system, given the crushing caseloads. I have
been able to continue to maintain my enthusiasm for the repre-
sentation of children in juvenile court in part because I am not
there every day.
Under more favorable circumstances, the potential for at-
tracting good people to juvenile court is limitless because the
mission of juvenile courts promises the ability to intervene
meaningfully in the lives of troubled children. Those of us who
caseloads and inadequate resources as causes for concern in the Cook County Juve-
nile Court. REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE 2 (1993). Each of these reports was prompted by the rec-
ognition that theJuvenile Court of Cook County was in crisis. Indeed, the most quali-
fied judges sought to avoid assignment to juvenile court.
Beginning in 1995, with the election of a new Chief Judge of the Circuit Court,
Donald P. O'Connell, Cook County has again initiated a campaign to improve its Ju-
venile Court. This campaign has been sustained under the leadership ofJudge Nancy
S. Salyers, presiding judge of the Child Protection Division, andJudge WilliamJ. Hib-
bler, presiding judge of the Juvenile Justice Division. Qualified judges now seek as-
signment to juvenile court. The leadership of the juvenile court is now active in local
and national initiatives to improvejuvenilejustice and child protection.
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teach law students know that they clamor for the opportunity to
work with young clients and for careers in juvenile court.22 Many
would sacrifice prestigious law firm jobs and high salaries for
this opportunity. I am sure that the same holds true for young
social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists. Why then do ju-
venile courts consistently fail to take advantage of the talents of
people who would like to devote their lives to serving children?
The answer is simple. The work of the lawyers and judges in
our juvenile court and in most large urban courts is simply un-
manageable. It is impossible to do one's job thoroughly. The
numbers simply do not permit sufficient attention to individual
cases. Moreover, there are few dispositional alternatives which
adequately meet the needs of the children who come before the
court. This is demoralizing to those who care about their work.
As a consequence, positions are hard to fill with highly skilled
people; many highly motivated people leave out of frustration.
3. Funding
Our juvenile court judges are paid reasonable salaries. So
are our public defenders, public guardians, and state's attor-
neys. This is not to say that they do not deserve more. There is
great demand for these jobs as there is for the positions of pro-
bation officer, deputy sheriff, and court clerk. Cook County has
recently devoted substantial funds for renovation and new
building at our juvenile court complex. However, the fact re-
mains that the Circuit Court of Cook County would not tolerate
the levels of caseload per judge in its "complex case" civil divi-
sion as seen in the Cook CountyJuvenile Court.2 No private law
office would saddle its lawyers with 400-500 cases each as is
common in our Cook County Public Defender's office. The
choices seem clear: reduce intake through utilization of effec-
tive screening protocols and community-based diversion pro-
2 See Donald N. Duquette, Developing a Child Advocacy Law Clinic: A Law School
Clinical Legal Opportunity, 31 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 1 (1997).
Statistics generated by the Clerk of the Circuit Court indicate that during the
month of December, 1997 there were a total of 23,267 active petitions pending in the
Juvenile Justice Division of the Juvenile court of Cook County. Report 9-F, In The
Circuit Court of Cook County, County Department, Juvenile Division (Dec. 1997) (on
file with author). There are 16 judges assigned to that division. Each of those court-
rooms has three prosecutors and three public defenders assigned to it. This means




grams, or increase the number of personnel required compe-
tently to address the needs of the children and families who ap-
pear in juvenile court.
Does lack of funding drive the difficulty in obtaining social
and treatment services for my clients? In some cases yes, in
some cases no. Often, the reasons for the "unavailability" of
services are lack of knowledge about their availability and the
difficulty of securing funding for them. Indeed, the tasks of
knowing about available services and how to fund them are im-
portant but neglected sub-specialties which should be better de-
veloped within juvenile courts. In addition, our juvenile court
has no power to order state or private agencies to fund services
or placements. It can only commit children to state agencies
(the Department of Children and Family Services or the De-
partment of Corrections). The agency then has the discretion
to decide how to place and treat the child; the juvenile court
has no authority to see to it that the agency performs its assign-
ment. Moreover, once a child is committed to a state agency,
lack of funding may constrain the agency's decision to provide
needed services. 24
4. Effectiveness of Interventions
The old saying that "nothing works" has been pretty well
discredited. Those of us who represent children in juvenile
court, the vast majority of whom are poor, know that an individ-
ual or a program that forges a relationship with a child has a
good chance of succeeding. Indeed, families with financial re-
sources who have access to effective services often experience
successful treatment outcomes. The problem for most poor
children is finding the appropriate program and figuring out
how to pay for it. In Illinois, unfortunately, few such programs
for poor children exist. This means that failure of juvenile
" Funding forjuvenile delinquency prevention and intervention programs is a low
priority for most state legislatures. In Illinois, for example, funding for such pro-
grams has remained at the same levels for decades, while funding for new prison con-
struction had dramatically increased. Emily Wilkerson, Governor Signs Bond Authority:
$610 Million Will Go Toward Construction at Prisons, Universities, PEORIA STARJ., Feb. 21,
1997, at B7. Moreover, the Illinois Department of Children & Family Services
(DCFS), Illinois' child welfare agency with the largest budget, recently succeeded in
lobbying for legislation that essentially eliminates DCFS responsibility for funding
services for delinquent teens. See In re A.A., No. 81711, 81800, 1998 Ill. LEXIS, at 3
(Ill.Jan. 23, 1998) (interpreting 705 IL. Comp. STAT. 405/2-10. 2-17 (West 1997)).
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court intervention is caused not by programs that do not work,
but by the unavailability of or failure to identify programs that
do work. A multitude of programs designed to reduce recidi-
vism among young offenders have been shown to be successful.s2
Moreover, new approaches to interventions designed to change
the behaviors of children charged with crimes, such as the "bal-
anced and restorative justice" model26 are receiving substantial
attention from legislators and juvenile court personnel.
Recent initiatives to improve juvenile courts hold promise
that we can develop a juvenile justice system that will effectively
and humanely balance the needs of children and the protection
of the public.27 Initiatives such as these spark new excitement,
21 SeeJames C. Howell, The Nonsense of Abolishing the Juvenile Court 7 (1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author):
Distorted, misleading, and erroneous information about juvenile violence and
program effectiveness has endangered the future of the juvenile court. This is
most unfortunate because recent studies demonstrate convincingly that juvenile
court programs are highly effective. In fact, juvenile court treatment programs
are more effective than punishment and incarceration in juvenile training
schools and adult prisons. Surprisingly, juvenile court programs appear to be
more effective with more serious offenders than with less serious offenders-just
the opposite to the myth. The juvenile court is effective even with the hardest
cases, particularly when intervention occurs early in chronic offender careers.
This excellent paper contains a useful list of research findings regarding successes of
various forms of interventions. See also PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., DIVERTING CHILDREN
FROM A LIFE OF CRIME: MEASURING COSTS & BENEFITS (1996); DELBERT ELLIOTr ET AL.,
MULTIPLE PROBLEM YOUTH: DELINQUENCY, SUBSTANCE USE, AND MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS (1989); infra note 43 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Gordon Bazemore, What's New About the Balanced Approach, 48 Juv. &
FAM. CT.J. 1 (1997).
'The revitalization of the Cook CountyJuvenile Court is an example of this trend.
Collaboration between court administrators, judges, state's attorneys, public defend-
ers, public guardians, service providers, and universities have the potential to reinvig-
orate juvenile courts. In Chicago, for example, substantial funding from local and
national foundations has contributed to a sense of importance and excitement about
improving the performance of our juvenile court. Northwestern University's Chil-
dren and Family Justice Center has been a participant in this effort. The improve-
ment of the Juvenile Court of Cook County has been a collaborative effort between
the leadership of the Circuit Court of Cook County and a multitude of institutions
and agencies interested in the welfare of children who view the Juvenile Court of
Cook County as a vital community resource. The leadership of the Circuit Court of
Cook County and of the Juvenile Court of Cook County has adopted reform of the
Juvenile Court as a priority. This reform involves assigning highly qualified and moti-
vated judges to Juvenile Court, improving the facilities of the juvenile court, develop-
ing new computer systems to monitor the work of the Juvenile Court and its
associated agencies, developing more knowledge about screening mechanisms which
identify appropriate cases for adjudication-thereby reducing caseloads, and assess-
ing the quality and utilization of social, psychological, and psychiatric assessments and
services. See Children and FamilyJust. Center, Report of the Northwestern University
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commitment, and sense of professionalism among all who work
in juvenile courts and hold the potential to attract needed talent
to this vital institution.8
Ii. RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS: THE PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
I recognize that the ideas of those who practice in juvenile
court are not the only perspectives to be valued in this debate;
input from a variety of perspectives is essential to determining
the best possible way to address the problems of delinquent
youth and protection of the public. The future of juvenile
courts uniquely depends on a multitude of interests and influ-
ences. Judges, lawyers, social workers, psychologists, court ad-
ministrators, child welfare agencies, state departments of child
welfare and corrections all have considerable influence in the
debate. Perhaps most important are the state legislators who
are responsible for writing juvenile justice legislation and thus
have the ultimate power to shape the future of juvenile courts.
There has been little discussion about how constructive dia-
logues can be initiated between those who study juvenile court,
those who work in them, and the legislators who shape and im-
plement juvenile justice policy.2 For our juvenile justice system
Children & Family Justice Center (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
28 The Juvenile Defender Leadership Summit sponsored by the American Bar As-
sociation Juvenile justice Center, the Juvenile Law Center, and the Youth Law Center
that was held on October 24-26, 1997 at the Northwestern University School of Law
provided an example of this new excitement, commitment, and professionalism
among lawyers who represent children injuvenile court. The Summit's "statement of
need" emphasized the need for reinvigoration of the juvenile defense bar
The overall purpose ... is to bring together a diverse group of leading juvenile
defenders in order to explore new ways to invigorate, support, and inspire the
juvenile defense bar at large. Juvenile public defenders in offices around the
country have no medium through which to collaborate with defenders in other
jurisdictions. For that reason, most juvenile defenders do not have access to in-
novative ideas, alternative resources, training methods, shared brief banks, and
solutions to systemic problems. Counterparts to juvenile defenders (i.e., adult
defenders, juvenile prosecutors, judges, corrections officers, etc.) currently enjoy
the kind of collaborative network that sustains interactive communication be-
tween members of their profession. Juvenile defenders must find ways to im-
prove their ability to represent and obtain services for their youthful clients and
enhance professional development.
Overview of the Juvenile Defender Leadership Summit (Oct. 24-26, 1997) (on file
with author).
' A recent example of this phenomenon in Illinois is the process which may lead
to the enactment of a new Illinois Juvenile Court Act. The bill was drafted by a coali-
tion of prosecutors. Although the prosecutors did seek input from others, they ob-
206 THOMAS F. GERAGHTY [Vol. 88
to succeed, there must be a constructive collaboration between
practitioners, scholars, court administrators, and legislators.
Many of those who argue for a reinvigorated juvenile court
are or have been involved in the representation of children.
Their views about the question of whether juvenile courts
should be abolished or reinvigorated are based upon their as-
sessments of the alternative-the abandonment of children to a
criminal justice system that has no special focus on the unique
problems associated with the adjudication, support, and treat-
ment of children, ° and to a system that has proven ineffective in
curbing recidivism. The fact that involvement in the represen-
tation of children in juvenile court-even with all of the juvenile
court's shortcomings-leads most children's advocates to the
conclusion that the future of the juvenile court lies in preserva-
tion and improvement of the court rather than in its abolition is
a telling commentary on the merits of this debate.
Another reason for this preference among lawyers who rep-
resent children is that they know the facts and circumstances
that led their clients to face prosecution. Almost always, those
facts and circumstances are stories of low economic status, fam-
tamined and maintained control of the content of the bill and lobbied aggressively for
its passage. A description of a more inclusive and constructive approach to drafting
juvenile justice legislation is described by Professor Feld. See Feld, supra note 21; see
also Burns, supra note 19. The process which led to the enactment of the New Mexico
juvenile justice bill was a collaboration between the various constituencies concerned
about juvenile justice issues. Interview with Prof. Barbara Bergman, Univ. of New
Mexico School of Law, in Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 25, 1997).
See generally Smith, supra note 7; Fitzgerald, supra note 7; Catherine R. Guttman,
Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.RL-C.L.
L. REv. 507 (1995); Francine T. Sherman, Thoughts on a Contextual View ofJuvenileJus-
tice Reform Drawn from Narratives of Youth, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1837 (1995); Paul Holland
& Wallace J. Mlyniec, Whatever Happened to the Right to Treatment?: The Modem Quest for
a Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1791 (1995); Rosenberg, supra note 1.
3' See, e.g., Smith, supra note 7 (Smith is Deputy Director and Clinical Instructor at
the Criminal Justice Institute, Harvard Law School); Victor L. Streib, The Efficacy of
Harsh Punishments for Teenage Violence, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 427 (1997) (author was both
a prosecutor and defense lawyer). As Streib observes:
My turning away from the punishment approach came in part as a result of work-
ing with victims' families. Several times over the years, I have found myself lis-
tening to the stories of parents whose child has been murdered as they struggled
to deal with such unfathomable grief. Each time, I have been chagrined and
embarrassed to witness the criminal justice system, usually in the person of a lo-
cal prosecutor, promising to serve the needs of this victim's family by wreaking
horrible punishments on the person who killed iheir family member.
Id. at 429. See also David A. Harris, The Criminal Defense Lauyer In thejuvenilejustice
System, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 751 (1995); Rosenberg, supra note 1.
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ily dysfunction, lack of emotional support, educational deficits,
mental health problems, peer pressure, and, in the most serious
32
cases, the availability of a lethal weapon. Lawyers who repre-
sent children must obtain detailed and confidential social histo-
ries from their clients, as well as information surrounding the
commission of a crime, which may not be shared with other
professionals. Because of the confidentiality inherent in the
lawyer-client relationship, 8 lawyers for children may know these
facts and circumstances as well as, if not better than, anyone else
in the juvenile justice system. 4
These lawyers also know the dire and unproductive conse-
quences that ensue when children are transferred to criminal
court. Children who are incarcerated in juvenile and then adult
institutions for long periods of time lose contact with family
members and their communities. They become more gang-
involved than they were before entering the correctional system
and have higher rates of recidivism.! The educational oppor-
tunities within adult correctional systems are poor relative to
2 There have been innumerable studies and articles written concerning the indi-
vidual and environmental causes of delinquency. For an excellent annotated bibliog-
raphy of these materials, see Jean J. Davis et al., Bibliography of Selected Juvenile Justice
Resources, 5J.L. & POL'Y 385 (1996). See generally VIOLENCE &YOUTH: PSYCHOLOGy's
RESPONSE, SUMMARY (1993); ELuOTr CURRIE, RECKONING- DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE
AMERCAN FUTURE 3 (1993); ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIE IN THE
MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE (1993); JoYCE OATES, FOXFIRE:
CONFESSIONS OF A GIRL GANG (1993); JAMES GARBARINO, No PLACE TO BE A CHILD,
GROWING UP IN A WAR ZONE (1991); MICHAEL R. GOITFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A
GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME (1990); ELLIOrr CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN
AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1985); Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups, and Crime: Some Impli-
cations of a Well-Known Secret, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867 (1981).
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RFSPONSIBXIY Rule 1.6 (1983).
Admittedly, lawyers for children in crowded juvenile systems sometimes know
their clients least well of all of the professionals who work with these children. Often,
in such settings, lawyers meet with their clients only on the days when their clients
appear in court and thus are not able to establish optimum lawyer-client relation-
ships. However, even in juvenile court systems in which lawyers carry unconscionable
caseloads, they are still in a unique position to assess their clients' alleged criminal ac-
tivity, their clients' backgrounds, and the constructiveness of the sanctions and treat-
ment experienced by their clients.
A 1996 study concluded, after reviewing 50juvenile transfer cases that recidivism
rates are higher among juveniles transferred to adult criminal court than among
those who remain under juvenile jurisdiction. The study suggests that there is a
trade-off between the short-term public safety benefit of juvenile transfer to adult
criminal court and the long-term effects of increased recidivism. James C. Howell, ju-
venile Transfers to the CriminalJustice System: State-of-the-Art, 18J.L. & POLY 58-60 (1996).
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those in juvenile correctional institutions.3 Children who face
adult sentences experience additional tragedy. In many cases,
they will be institutionalized for longer periods of time.37 In
most states, while younger "adult sentenced" juveniles will be
kept in juvenile facilities for some period of time, most of them
will be transferred to adult institutions at age sixteen or seven-
teen to complete their sentencess There they will be raped, 9
For studies of deteriorating educational services in juvenile detention facilities,
see OSA D. Co= & MAi G. GEMIGNANI, EFFECTIVE PRACnTCES IN JUVENILE
CORRECTIONAL EDUCATION: A STUDY OF THE LITERATURE AND RESEARCH, 1980-1992
(1994); D. PARENT ET AL., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1994).
As the American Bar Association'sJuvenile Justice Standards state in § 10.6 ("Edu-
cation") of Part X: Standards for Juvenile Detention Facilities: "All accused juveniles
held in interim detention should be afforded access to the educational institution
they normally attend, or to equivalent tutorial or other programs adequate to their
needs, including an educational program for 'exceptional children."' INSTITUTE OF
JUD. ADMrN.-AM. BAR ASS'N JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED
APPROACH 141 (Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. ed., 1996) [hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS]. See also C. FRAZIER, DEEP ENDJUvENILEJUSTICE PLACEMENTS OR TRANSFER
TO ADULT COURT BY DIRECT FILE? (1991) (a report prepared by the Florida Legislative
Comm'n on Juv. Just.); J. Fagan, Separating the Men From the Boys: The Comparative Ad-
vantage ofJuvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony
Offenders, in SOURCEBOOK ON SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONICJUVENILE OFFENDERS 238-
74 (J.C. Howell et al. eds., 1995).
37 See J. FAGAN, URSA INSTITUTE: SEPARATING THE MEN FROM THE Boys: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OFYOUTH VIOLENCE THROUGHJUDICIAL WAIVER 55 (1987) (conclud-
ing that in a study of Boston, Newark, Detroit, and Phoenix, youths transferred to
criminal court received considerably longer sentences than youths in juvenile court);
P.W. GREENWOOD ET AL., FACTORS AFFECTING OFFENSE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG OFFENDERS
(1984) (comparing juvenile court dispositions ofjuveniles with young adult robbery
and burglary sentences in Las Vegas, Seattle, and Los Angeles from 1971-1973, and
concluding that juveniles with extensive prior records received longer sentences than
adults); P.W. GREENWOOD ET AL., YOUTH CRIME ANDJUVENLEJUSTICE IN CALFORNIA: A
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1983) (comparing juvenile court dispositions of juve-
niles with young adult robbery and burglary sentences in three large California juris-
dictions from 1971-1973, and concluding that criminal court sentences were longer
than juvenile court sentences except when juveniles had prior record).
-" In Illinois, for example, juveniles tried as adults are committed to the Juvenile
Division of the Department of Corrections until they turn 17. Although the Juvenile
Division may keep a juvenile found guilty as an adult until age 21, most "adult sen-
tenced" juveniles are transferred to the adult division of the Department of Correc-
tions when they turn 17 or 18. These transfers are made in part because of
overcrowding within the juvenile division of the Department of Corrections. The Ju-
venile Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) is 170% over capac-
ity. The adult division of the IDOC is 163% over capacity. Report of Proceedings at
46, In reW.S. &J.W., 96JD 14650, 97JD3753, & 97JD3751 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Juve-
nile Div. Aug. 19, 1997) (testimony of Michael Furrie, Administrator, IDOC) (on file
with author). Such testimony is routinely presented by the prosecution in Cook
CountyJuvenile Court transfer hearings to address the question of whether there are
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forced to swear life-long allegiance to gangs to survive, 40 and de-
humanized.4' The long-term consequences of incarcerating
young offenders for lengthy periods of time under these condi-
tions are clear-the release into society of an increasing number
of dysfunctional middle-aged men and women and the expendi-
ture of vast sums to protect the public from them.42
Given the vulnerabilities of our clients, the horrors of what
children face in adult institutions, and our admittedly imperfect
record in designing juvenile justice, prevention, and treatment
systems, how should we choose between the many competing
models ofjustice for young offenders? One way of resolving the
issue is to try to reason our way to a solution based upon the ap-
plication of logic to decide what principles of responsibility
should apply to young people who commit crimes. Another way
"facilities particularly available to the juvenile court for the treatment of the minor."
725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 405/4-5(3) (b) (v) (West 1997).
" See DALE PARENT ET AL., KEY LEGISLATIVE ISSUES IN CRIMINALJUSTICE: TRANSFERRING
SERIOUSJUVENILE OFFENDERS 2 (1997) (lists "risk of being raped or assaulted by older
inmates" as the first key legislative issue); see also NATIONAL INST. OF CORREcTIONS,
OFFENDERS UNDER 18 IN STATE ADULT CORRECIONAL SYSTEMS: A NATIONAL PICTURE
(1995).
" See generally BuREAu OFJUST. ASSISTANCE INST. FOR L. &JUST., URBAN STREET GANG
ENFORCEMENT (1997); JAMES C. HOWELL, YOUTH GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
OVERVIEW (1997).
"' See generally ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W. DALEY, CHANGING THE CONDITIONS OF
PRISONS AND JAILS (1997) (a survey of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuits by prisoners against
prison officials nationwide); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAwINS, LETHAL
VIOLENCE AND THE OVERREACH OF AMERICAN IMPRISONMENT (1996); H. TOCH, LIVING IN
PRISON: THE ECOLOGY OF SURVIVAL (1977).
4 2 Accord Guttman, supra note 30, at 509:
Unless society intends to lock up every child who enters the justice system for the
rest of his or her life, it must acknowledged that these children will ultimately re-
enter society. Society's treatment of these children during their incarceration
will affect who they are when they return to their communities.
This point was reaffirmed convincingly by Professor Stephen Shulhoffer, who de-
scribes the human and economic waste of "broad, automatically punitive responses"
to juvenile crime:
Give a twenty-six-year-old robber a ten year sentence, and he returns to the street
at age thirty-six, well past his prime for predatory offending. But sentence a four-
teen-year-old to ten years in prison for a purse snatching and you are almost
guaranteeing that he will spend his formative years in an environment with no af-
fection, no positive role models, and no useful education other than an intensive
immersion in the ways of crime and brutality... An enterprise that is destined to
produce these sorts of results does not seem to bear possible use of scarce re-
sources.
Stephen J. Shulhoffer, Youth Crime and What Not To Do About It, 31 VAL. U. L. REV.
435, 443-44 (1997).
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of approaching the problem is to examine the question of
whether we can make reasoned distinctions between those we
treat as juveniles and those we try in criminal court. We could
also ask whether juvenile courts, because of their low status and
the absence of the procedural protection of the jury trial, can
be trusted to dispense justice to children. We should also con-
sider the question of whether effective rehabilitative services can
ever be delivered on the massive scale needed to make real in-
roads.3 Finally, we must ask, as do Professors Scott and Grisso,
" For a comprehensive directory of treatment services around the nation that
work, see IMOGENE MONTGOMERY ET AL., WHAT WORKS: PROMISING INTERVENTIONS IN
JUvENiI.EJUsTICnE (1994). The foreword of this Department ofJustice, Office ofJuve-
nile Justice program directory, asserts that juvenile rehabilitative programs work and
always have worked:
In the 1970s, the message issued by the research community concerning
the use of prevention and treatment programs for juveniles was that "nothing
works." This unfortunate and, as it turned out, erroneous conclusion, together
with increasing serious juvenile delinquency, fueled confinement of larger num-
bers of juveniles throughout the 1980s. Juveniles were increasingly turned over
to the criminal courts. These trends continue to this day.
Now we find that treatment programs for juveniles do work-and were
working all the while. This report ... describes a variety of successful prevention
and treatment programs in the juvenile justice system. Compiled by the National
Center for Juvenile Justice, it represents the results of a nationwide survey of
3,000 juvenile justice professionals, including juvenile and family court judges,
court administrators, probation officers, and line staff. The respondents nomi-
nated over 1,100 programs they deemed effective in their jurisdiction. After
careful review, 425 programs merited designation as promising interventions.
Id. at iii.
Perhaps the most comprehensive study ofjuvenile treatment programs to date
made a similar conclusion in 1992:
It is no longer constructive for researchers, practitioners, and policy-makers
to argue about whether delinquency treatment and related rehabilitative ap-
proaches work. As a generality, treatment clearly works. We must get on with
the business of developing and identifying the treatment models that will be
most effective and providing them to the juveniles they will benefit.
M. W. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability
of Effects, in META-ANALYSIS FOR ExPLANATION 126 (T.D. Cook et al. eds., 1996).
High quality services for children who need intensive and sophisticated interven-
tions are hard to come by. In Illinois, for example, community-based interventions
and intensive, structured residential programs for children at risk are difficult to ac-
cess. Thus for children requiring on-going attention and/or treatment, the alterna-
tive is often placement in very expensive out-of-state facilities, or commitment to the
juvenile division of the Department of Corrections. The scarcity of in-state resources
is the result of the expense of maintaining them, lack of economic incentives to cre-
ate them, and the view that children who offend do not deserve state-of-the-art inter-
ventions. See Holland & Myleniec, supra note 30, at 1833. There is also the concern
that money spent on these resources will not prevent recidivism. However, when
compared to the cost of lengthy incarcerations, which increased referrals to criminal
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whether the potential for constructive treatment-based out-
comes required by the psychological needs of children are more
possible in juvenile court than in criminal court."
There are additional questions to ask in deciding the future
of justice for children. Perhaps the most important questions
are: (1) what kind of system ofjustice for children is most likely
to be flexible and child-centered while at the same time taking
into account the needs and interests of the public? and (2) what
kind of system of justice for children will continue to motivate
our society to continue to search, with flexibility in light of ex-
perience, for new answers to the question of how best to adjudi-
cate and treat young people accused of crimes?
III. ARFAS OF AGREEMENT:
ABOLITIONISTS AND PRESERVATIONISTS CONCUR
Identification of areas of consensus regarding a debated is-
sue sometimes has the effect of demonstrating that the "dispu-
tants" agree on more issues than they debate. Refining the
debate to the actual disputed points focuses the discussion and
makes it more productive. In the debate over the future of jus-
tice for children, there are three points that are not in contro-
versy: (1) children are fundamentally different in their cognitive
and moral decision-making capabilities than adults; (2) the ju-
court will inevitably cause, investment in state-of-the-art programs for youthful of-
fenders makes economic and social sense: economic because most youth can be
treated given appropriate services, and social because rehabilitative programs di-
rected toward youth have a good chance of preventing recidivism. See; e.g., Melissa M.
Moon et al., Reclaiming Ohio: A Politically Viable Alternative to Treating Youthful Offenders,
43 CRuME & DEuNQ. 488 (1997) (describing a system which provides counties with fi-
nancial incentives to keep youthful offenders out of state-run juvenile correctional fa-
cilities); Laurence Winner et al., The Transfer ofJuveniles to Criminal Court: Reexamining
Recidivism Over the Long-Term, 43 CRImE & DELJNQ. 548, 558-59 (1997) (finding that in
Florida, "[transfer was more likely to aggravate recidivism than to stem it").
" Scott & Grisso argue convincingly that a court which focuses on the interests of
children is more likely to have interdisciplinary connections with a variety of helping
professions. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A De-
velopmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88J. GRMl. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 137, 181-
89 (1997). A justice system with a child-centered focus fosters closer analysis of the
causes of behavior and the potential for constructive interventions. When a lawyer
develops a strategy for representing a child client, that strategy will always involve an
assessment of the child's world with the objective of designing appropriate interven-
tions should there be a finding of delinquency. The flexibility of the juvenile justice
system permits this inquiry to take place. The rigidity of the adult system prevents
this inquiry from taking place.
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venilejustice system has failed to satisfy expectations for provid-
ing procedural protection and successful interventions; and (3)
the juvenile justice system cannot survive solely by relying upon
the historical justifications for its founding. The point that is in
controversy is Professor Feld's conclusion that juvenile courts
should be abolished as a consequence of points 1 and 2 . How-
ever, a close examination of the points of agreement, I argue,
makes abolition of the juvenile court unnecessary and undesir-
able.
The developmental and "moral decision-making" differ-
ences between children and adults support the proposition that
we should distinguish between the sanctions we impose upon
children and those we impose upon adults. The fact that juve-
nile courts have failed to live up to expectations requires that we
reconceptualize and re-tool the court rather than abolish it.
The lack of procedural protections which are of concern to Pro-
fessor Feld 46 can be solved by providing child-sensitive jury trials
in juvenile court.
A. CHILDREN ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT THAN ADULTS
The reality that children are fundamentally different than
adults in their ability to make moral judgments and more ame-
nable to treatment than adults has always been at the heart of
the juvenile court movement. These differences are not dis-
puted by any of the authors in this Symposium. Indeed, the de-
velopmental differences between children and adults are
acknowledged and underscored by many authors47 and by psy-
chologists and psychiatrists. 8
Neither Professor Feld nor Professor Morse dispute these
basic propositions about the relative capacity of children and
adults to make reasoned judgments. Of course, the extent of
"' SeeFeld, supra note 1.46 1&
17 There are many studies that assert this rather intuitive proposition. See, e.g., L.
Mann et al., Adolescent Decision-Making: The Development of Competence, 12 J.
ADOLESCENCE 265 (1989).
"' See, e.g., Elizabeth Caffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective In-
fluences on Adolescent Decision-making 68 TEM?. L. REV. 1763, 1787 (1995) (criticizes the
assumptions of the informed consent model that adolescents and adults are cogni-
tively similar).
'9 See Feld, supra note 1, at 104-14; Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility,
88J. CasM. L. & CRBMNOLOGY 15, 49 (1997).
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the "fundamental difference" between children and adults de-
pends on the age, sophistication, and personality development
of the child at issue. 0 A lust" system, therefore, would be a sys-
tem which combines fair adjudication, punishment in propor-
tion to the child's responsibility, and dispositions that recognize
rehabilitation, consistent with a "responsibility" message, and
the need to protect the public.51 Professors Feld and Morse
would not dissent from this proposition either. A 'just" system,
especially one that addresses the problems of young people,
must be flexible but consistent in its response to individual chil-
dren, to the nature of the societal problems presented to it, and
to the evolving lessons of child and adolescent development.
Morse's position that children should have imposed on them
more responsibility for their actions52 and Feld's argument that
more consistency can be achieved in the adult court setting with
a "youth discount" mitigating the harshness of adult sentences,S
are not incompatible with these propositions.
B. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM HAS FAILED TO SATISFY
EXPECTATIONS
Another fact that is not disputed is that juvenile courts and
their associated agencies have historically fallen short. Juvenile
courts have failed to adequately protect the procedural rights of
the children who appear in juvenile court. Associated agencies
have failed to provide sufficient state-of-the-art interventions.
The first set of criticisms is justified: juvenile courts (and, in-
deed, criminal courts) have failed to adhere to the highest ide-
als of due process. The second set of criticisms, while justified,
should not compel the conclusion that juvenile courts be abol-
ished. Juvenile courts should not shoulder the blame for in-
adequate or unsuccessful interventions on behalf of children.
0 There are numerous studies that conclude that such factors as these affect aju-
venile's criminal sophistication. See generally JAMES C. HOWE.L, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
YOuTHVIOLENCE 133 (1997).
" The moral and developmental differences between children and adults cannot
rest as the only justification for separate juvenile courts. Children's courts must also
justify their existence by treating children effectively and by demonstrating sensitivity
to the need to protect the public. Although no court can in fact protect the public,
the political pressure to move away from a rehabilitative model of the juvenile court
will persist if it appears that the juvenile courts are not meeting the goals of fair adju-
dication, adequate punishment and incapacitation, and effective treatment.
"SeeMorse, supra note 49, at 17-61.
"SeeFeld, supra note 1, at 96-97.
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1. Failure to Adhere to Due Process
Although the parens patriae and rehabilitative ideals of the
court have long enjoyed considerable appeal, the implementa-
tion of those ideals has been problematic. The parens patriae
philosophy led to the abuses of judicial and administrative
power that Gaule' sought to curtail. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gault did not eradicate those abuses.5 Lack of resources
and power allocated to defense counsel for children, as well as
continuing reluctance on the part of judges to fully implement
due process protections, leave many children in our juvenile
courts in the pre-Gault "worst of both worlds."
Overburdened defense counsel cannot make effective assis-
tance of counsel a reality. The provision of lawyers who are
hamstrung by too many cases is not a meaningful implementa-
tion of the Sixth Amendment.5 6 The right to a procedurally
"regular" hearing is also impossible when a judge has too many
cases on his call. The priority becomes disposition of cases
(with heavy reference on plea bargaining), rather than upon
full and fair adjudication of facts. The right to confront wit-
nesses is also compromised to the extent of being relatively
meaningless when too many cases clog the system. The full ex-
ercise of rights is restricted by lawyer and judicial practices
which encourage children to forego their procedural rights in
order to secure promised (and often undelivered) benefits of
supportive interventions.
2. Failure to Solve the Problem of Crime Committed by Children
Many of the critics of juvenile courts argue that the jurisdic-
tion ofjuvenile courts should be limited and that juvenile courts
should be abolished because they have not been effective in
preventing crime committed by children. However, the role of
a court is not to curb crime. The role of a court is to find facts
fairly and to impose sentences which take into account a myriad
of factors, including the seriousness of the offense, the culpabil-
ity of the child, the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, and
protection of the public.
"In reGault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
" See, e.g., A CALL FORJUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUAITY
OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS, REPORT OF THE AM. BAR ASS'NJUV.
JUST. CENTER (Patricia Puritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter A CALL FORJUSTICE].
' U.S. CONT. amend. VI.
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The unfairness to children and to the concept of the juve-
nile court (admittedly a lesser consideration) of expecting that
juvenile courts can, by themselves, curb crime is underscored by
the fact that many of our largest juvenile courts have always
been under funded and understaffed. An example of this phe-
nomenon is, again, the Juvenile Court of Cook County, where
judges in the delinquency division of the court have 1,500-2,000
cases on their calendars. Public defenders' caseloads can be as
high as 400 cases at any one timeY The three to four state's at-
torneys assigned to each of these courtrooms are responsible for
prosecuting all of the cases assigned to the judge. Under these
circumstances, we cannot expect any court to meet expecta-
tions. However, transferring the problems of this over-loaded
system to the adult criminal courts (which are themselves
stretched beyond capacity) cannot be the answer.
C. THEJUVENILEJUSTICE SYSTEM CANNOT SURVIVE BYRELYING
SOLELY UPON THE HISTORICALJUSTIFICATIONS FOR ITS
FOUNDING
The original motivations for the founding of the juvenile
courts, by themselves, support continuation of "business as
usual" in our juvenile courts; advocates of retaining and
strengthening juvenile courts cannot rely upon the noble urge
to "save children." First, there is considerable doubt that the
founders of juvenile courts ever intended to include within its
jurisdiction all children who break the law. In fact, during the
early history of the juvenile court, many children were tried as
adults.5 s This history underscores the question of whether the
juvenile court was ever meant to address the problems with the
small population of "serious" or "violent" offenders we see today
in our juvenile and in our criminal courts. The youngsters
whom the founders of the juvenile court sought to help were,
for the most part, charged with minor offenses.59 The new (real
and perceived) challenges faced by juvenile courts-increased
7 In 1995, in Cook County, "in some delinquency courtrooms, attorneys handled
more than 450 cases per year ... lawyers may have 15 cases set for trial on one day, or
40 to 50 cases on calendar for a day." A CALLTOJUSTICE, supra note 55, at 25.
-" In the firstjuvenile court in Illinois there was concurrent jurisdiction over seri-
ous crimes between criminal andjuvenilejurisdictions. On June 4, 1907, the Illinois
Juvenile Court Act was amended to allow for discretionary transfer to adult court. See
1907 ILL. LAWS §9, 70-72. See generally Tanenhaus, supra note 17.
59
SeeCrMZENS' INVESUGATING COMM., supra note 21, at 9.
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61caseloads, 60 a population with more access to lethal weapons,
more public attention focused on the work of juvenile courts as
a consequence of the notoriety of some delinquent behavior,62
the need to strengthen families and schools, 63 the involvement
of young children in a drug trade dominated by adults," and
peer pressure displacing family systems-all raise questions
about the efficacy of a juvenile court model which was created
in a different era. However, the fact that we face new chal-
lenges-e.g., changes in family systems-simply means that ju-
venile courts must adapt to a changing reality for children and
families. This is exactly what the founders of the juvenile court
attempted with the creation of the court and its associated social
service providers.
The fact that we face the challenge of making juvenile
courts and associated social service and correctional systems re-
sponsive to the needs of today's children and society does not
require that juvenile courts be abolished. It means, rather, that
In 1995, an American Bar Association study concluded that the high caseloads of
juvenile courts was the single most important barrier to effective representation ofju-
veniles. A CALL FORJUSTICE, supra note 55, at 8 (1995). See also supra note 23 and ac-
companying text.
61 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, AGE-
SPECIFIC RATES & RAcE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES FOR SELECTED OFFENSES, 1965-1992
(1993) (from 1965-1992, violent crime among juveniles increased from an average of
65.1 offenses to 197.6 offenses per 100,000 juveniles). Although these rates are still
unacceptably high, this trend may have leveled off. See Lotke, supra note 4, at 401
("data for 1995 suggest that arrests ofjuveniles for homicide and other violent crimes
have started to decline"); B. KRSBERG ET AL., JUVENILES TAKEN INTO CUSTODY RESEARCH
PROGRAM: FY 1995 ANNUAL REPORT (1996).
62 The case of 11-year-old Robert Sandifer ignited nationwide concern. He alleg-
edly killed a 14-year-old girl and then was himself killed, allegedly by fellow gang
members. Nancy R. Gibbs, The Short, Violent Life of Robert "Yummy" Sandfer, So Young to
Kill, So Young to Die TIME, Sept. 9, 1994, at 54. President Clinton echoed popular sen-
timent over Sandifer in his weekly radio address:
Too many of [our children] are growing up in fear. All too many are growing up
without the values of mainstream society. ... By now, nearly all of us know the
story of Robert Sandifer, known as 'Yummy" to his friends.... Robert Sandifer's
grandmother despaired at his funeral because, she said, "I couldn't reach you."
We must keep doing everything we can to reach those children. And we must
help them respect the law to keep them safe. Next week I'll sign into law the his-
toric crime bill that will be a tough but smart tool . . . [to] punish hardened
young criminals with stronger penalties.
WilliamJ. Clinton, Audio Tape of Presidential Radio Address (Sept. 10, 1994).
6' Howell, supra note 25, at 134.
64 A 1989 study of Kansas City and Seattle concluded that most gang drug traffick-
ing in both cities was conducted either by retired, older members or much younger,
aspiring "wannabe"juveniles. Id. at 116.
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we are facing new challenges and that we must formulate the
most enlightened and efficient way of responding to them. A
response to Professor Morse's concerns about the extent to
which more responsibility should be imposed upon children is
to develop courts, social service, and correctional systems de-
signed to promote acceptance of responsibility and reinforce
positive behaviors. 5 New approaches to court administration,
programming for youth, and psycho-social interventions suggest
that our juvenile courts can be reinvigorated to meet new chal-
lenges.
V. No AGREEMENT: PROFESSOR FELD'S PROPOSAL
TO ABOLISH THEJUVENILE COURT
I make two arguments which support retaining and
strengthening juvenile courts rather than abolishing them. The
first is that criminal courts will never adapt themselves to the
distinct challenges of doing justice to children. The second ar-
gument is that procedural protections (including the right to
jury trial) could be provided in "re-tooled" juvenile courts with-
out destroying the distinctive mission ofjuvenile courts. First, I
turn to the reasons for not relying upon criminal courts to pro-
cess all criminal cases involving children.
A. THE OPERATION OF CRIMINAL COURTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN
URBAN AREAS, FALLS SHORT
Criminal courts in large urban areas are overburdened.
There are too many cases, too few lawyers representing too
many defendants, and too few resources to support probation
and correctional services. Indeed, many argue that our criminal
justice system (courts and correctional systems) are in a state of
crisis, despite the best intentions of the many and dedicated
lawyers, judges, and correctional workers who populate the sys-
tem. Overburdened courts and correctional agencies are simply
not prepared to absorb the number and character of the cases
which, if juvenile courts were abolished, would flood criminal
systems. This would be true even if all juvenile court resources
were shifted to criminal courts, because the crisis within our
criminal courts will likely not permit sufficient focus on re-
sources to be directed to the problems of children.
See e.g., Bazemore, supra note 27.
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B. CHILDREN WILL BE SECOND CLASS CITIZENS IN CRIMINAL
COURT
We know that given the history of the separate juvenile
court, and the history of child welfare systems generally, that
children would be second class citizens in a unified criminal
court.6 We know this from the history of juvenile courts them-
selves: juvenile courts have always been the neglected stepchil-
dren of court systems.67 This is because the children in juvenile
court have no social or economic power. The status of the spe-
cial needs of children within a criminal court system would be
even lower.
In a unified system, there would be no hope that a sophisti-
cated children's court, with judges, defenders, and prosecutors
who specialize in the adjudication and disposition of offenses
committed by children, would develop. There is substantial
evidence that these specialties will develop in the near future in
separate juvenile courts.r Although this argument would be
more powerful if juvenile courts had performed better and had
even more promise, we should not make matters worse for chil-
dren and for society by subjecting children to a criminal justice
system that has no incentives to take their special needs into ac-
count.
In juvenile courts, children's advocates "lobby" for better
court administration, better judges, and better services. Some
of this lobbying is performed by lawyers in the context of the
representation of individual clients. Good probation and social
66 See, e.g., ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT
EXPERIMENT (1978); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DEINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977).
61 Price & Boersema, supra note 12, at 2 (finding that "the greatest future needs of
the juvenile court have implications for resource utilization and funding").
68 The proliferation of law school clinical programs devoted to the representation
of children may provide the juvenile justice system with highly motivated, knowledge-
able, and competent lawyers in the near future. Such programs exist at many law
schools including Loyola University (Chicago), University of Chicago, Georgetown
University Law Center, New York University School of Law, Northwestern University
School of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law, Yale Law School, University of
Miami School of Law, University of Florida School of Law, University of Texas School
of Law, and the University of Michigan School of Law. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
SECTION OF LITIGATION TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN, DIRECTORY OF CHILDREN'S LAW
PROGRAMS (1996). For an eloquent description of the benefits to juvenile courts, to
the profession, and to law schools of such programs, see Donald N. Duquette, Develop-
ing a Child Advocacy Law Clinic: A Law School Clinical Legal Education Opportunity, 31 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1997).
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service providers lobby for better resources with which to serve
the children for whom they are responsible. The potential for
improvement of court and social services through collaboration
between legal and social service providers is enormous.69
Needless to say, this "lobbying" on behalf of the interests of
children is not always as effective as it could be. However, chil-
dren tried in criminal court would have less effective special
voices advocating for their interests, thus making their plight
worse than it is now. The very existence ofjuvenile courts keeps
alive a special focus on the causes, prevention, and cures for de-
linquent behavior. The interests of children and the special fo-
cus on causes, prevention, and cures in a unified criminal
system would necessarily become subsidiary to the goal of the
new unified criminal court-that goal being the efficient trial of
cases and sentencing of all defendants.
C. CHILDREN WILL BE SUBJECTED TO THE INFLUENCE OF ADULTS
CHARGED WITH CRIMES TRIED IN CRIMINAL COURT
One goal of maintaining separate juvenile court systems is
the separation of children from adult criminal defendants.
There are common sense reasons for this. Children should be
protected from older and stronger adults who might assault and
injure them. Children are easily pressured into criminal behav-
ior by adults.70 One answer to this objection to abolition of ju-
venile courts is that a unified juvenile/criminal justice system
could function without mixing children with adults. Separate
detention facilities could be maintained. Within criminal court
systems, separate courtrooms and divisions could be established
to handle cases involving children. Will such attempts at physi-
cal separation be successful? Although strict age guidelines
could be used for purposes of placement in detention, will it be
desirable even to have older and younger people charged with
69 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
70 Many lawyers who represent children have seen the powerful influences that
adult co-defendants or gang leaders can have on young people. There is an increas-
ing number of children who find themselves charged with crimes because they have
been recruited into criminal organizations and have been required by their elders to
support the criminal activities of the organizations. The case study described at the
beginning of this article is just one such example. Another example is the life and
death of an 11-year-old killed in Chicago allegedly because he "knew too much" about
gang activities. See Gibbs, supra note 62, at 54.
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crimes mixing together in the hallways and courtrooms of
criminal courts?
How will the new court that Professor Feld envisions deter-
mine which children should remain separated from adult
criminal defendants? Will age be the determining factor? Will
judges be required to determine the degree of the child's so-
phistication before requiring separation from adults? The op-
portunities for domination and influence of the younger by the
older multiply in a criminal court system responsible for trying
both children and adults.
If juvenile courts were abolished, there would probably be
some "unified" criminal courts that would employ careful and
enforceable measures designed to prevent children and adults
from coming into contact with each other. In these criminal
courts, "special" courts and/or systems would be developed to
process cases involving children. In criminal court systems in
which cases of children were separated from those of adults,
new, but less autonomous juvenile courts might develop within
the structures of adult criminal courts. But these new, less
autonomous, juvenile courts, located in adult criminal courts,
would inevitably have fewer specialized resources for children.
They would be subsidiaries of adult criminal courts, far more
likely to be a "poor relations" than independent, autonomous
institutions. Inevitably, the influence of practices, themes, and
attitudes which play out in adult court-a high level of adversar-
iness; a sense of despair and hopelessness regarding the causes
of crime and the potential of prevention and rehabilitation-
based programs; a lack of attention to individualized needs; and
harsh determinate sentencing 71 -would all be present in the di-
visions of the criminal courts which, under Professor Feld's pro-
posal, would process children.
The existence of separate juvenile courts is a powerful and
enduring symbol of the fact that children are in most cases less
morally responsible for commission of crime than adults. With-
out a separate court this basic difference will be lost on ourjus-
tice system. Moreover, the impact of our juvenile and criminal
7 See Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward,
78 JUDICATURE 169, 169 (1995); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can
Learn From the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 577, 578 (arguing that as
imperfect as the juvenile justice system is, the adult criminal justice system is likely to
be worse forjuveniles).
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justice systems are felt disproportionately by African-American
and Hispanic youth and by children with low socio-economic
status. Thus the population most in need of social services will
be deprived of them. 2 Youth most at risk will receive even less
73attention than they receive now.
D. JURY TRIALS CONDUCTED IN CRIMINAL COURTS WILL BE
INCOMPREHENSIBLE AND INTIMIDATING TO CHILDREN
Under Professor Feld's proposal, jury trials would be guar-
anteed to juveniles as a consequence of being tried in criminal
court. 4 Will the availability of a jury trial in a criminal court
benefit juvenile defendants? This is a subject about which there
is much disagreement. Before reaching that question, however,
it should be noted that whether juveniles are afforded jury trials
or not need not depend on whether they are tried in adult or in
juvenile court. Juvenile courts could continue to function as
separate entities and provide jury trials; there is no inconsis-
tency between the goals of a rehabilitation, balanced punish-
ment, and the availability ofjury trials.75
There is no reason that legislators must chose between a
purely punitive, adversarial system and one whose only priority
is rehabilitation. It is possible to combine all elements of a de-
72 For example, a 1994 study of National Youth Survey data found that by the time
subjects reached age 20, African-Americans were five-times more likely to be arrested
for a serious violent offense than their Caucasian counterparts. The study suggested
that because young African-Americans have fewer economic opportunities, they are
more likely to become "more deeply embedded in and dependent upon the gangs
and the illicit economy that flourish in their neighborhoods." D.S. Elliott, Serious Vo-
lent Offenders: Onset, Developmental Course, and Termination, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 19 (1994);
Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGy 10, 36 (1995).
,' Cook County provides another example. Children automatically transferred to
criminal court for possessing guns or weapons in or about public housing or schools
normally receive adult probationary sentences. The ratio of children to probation of-
ficers in the Cook County Juvenile Court is approximately 25:1. The ratio in the
Cook County Criminal Court is much higher. Interview with William Sifferman,
Deputy Director, Juvenile Probation, Juvenile Court of Cook County, in Chicago, Ill.
(Jan. 28, 1998).
7 4 Feld, supra note 1, at 87-89.
,* The Supreme Court's holding in McKiever that states are not required to provide
jury trials in juvenile court is based upon the mistaken notion that jury trials will in-
ject more adversariness into the juvenile system than is already present. See McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). The holding relied on an incorrect assertion
that juvenile correctional institutions were not punitive. That belief is outdated now,
especially in light of the increasingly punitive nature of the new juvenile justice legis-
lation. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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sirable justice system into one court that would provide all due
process protections available to adults, including jury trials, as
well as specialized and flexible rehabilitative and correctional
dispositions. We can address Professor Feld's concerns about
the arbitrariness of juvenile court judges by making jury trials
more available in juvenile court and by placing the most highly
qualified public defenders, prosecutors, and judges in juvenile
court.7 6
Providing jury trials to children in juvenile court need not
transform juvenile courts into adult criminal courts. First, the
exercise of the right would probably be infrequent. Second, ju-
venile courts could adopt practices and procedures that would
adapt jury trials to the capacities and needs of children, some-
thing that would probably not happen in adult criminal courts.
Moving children to adult court to afford them the right to a
jury trial would subject them to a judicial/legal culture even
more incomprehensible to them than the judicial/legal culture
that exists in juvenile courts. 77 The degree of the child's inabil-
ity to comprehend the adult system will inevitably result in chal-
lenges to youngsters' fitness to stand trial based upon
developmental considerations, an issue which juvenile courts
can sometimes avoid.78 According to Grisso, children do not
grasp "abstract legal concepts" such as "rights" generally under-
stood by adults. Moreover, children's understanding of the trial
process is poorer than that of adults. Children often have diffi-
culty "separating defense attorney functions from court author-
ity." Finally, "pre-adolescents are significantly less capable of
imagining risky consequences of decisions."79
76 States should make the right to jury trial in juvenile court co-extensive with the
right to jury trial in adult criminal proceedings where, if incarceration exceeds six
months, a jury trial is required if demanded. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
77 See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 174 n.66 ("I cannot believe that the proverbial
visitor from Mars, if planted down in the juvenile courts and the criminal courts, and
asked to determine which would be better in terms of protecting children, would not
conclude that the juvenile courts are far superior").
78 See Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Competency to Stand Tria, Questions in an Era of Punitive
Reform, CRIM.JUST., Fall 1997, at 4-11.
71 Id. at 11.
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E. JURY TRIALS HELD INJUVENILE COURT NEED NOT BE
FRIGHTENING AND INCOMPREHENSIBLE
My experience of trying cases in juvenile court when com-
pared to trying cases in adult criminal court is that the adult
court proceeding is more "formal" and less "flexible." What do
the terms "formal" and "flexible" mean in this context? "For-
mal" means "rigid," "severe," "solemn," "intimidating." "Flexi-
ble" means "pliant," "sensitive," "understanding." In adult court
jury trials all of the actors participate in a system that is charac-
terized by formality, not flexibility. In a "flexible" system, jury
trials of children would be characterized by the ability of the ju-
venile court judge to take into consideration the child's history,
needs, and interests at every stage of the proceeding.
Although jury trials are increasingly being used in juvenile
court,0 there is little discussion in the literature about how jury
trials involving children should be conducted differently from
those in which defendants are tried. However, there is consid-
erable discussion about how jury trials can be made more re-
sponsive to the needs of children who testify as witnesses and
victims. We need to think creatively about this problem, but
are unlikely to do so if children are subjected to jury trials in a
system designed for adults. In that system, we are likely to as-
sume (mistakenly and tragically) that one jury trial procedure
fits all.
Those of us who have represented children in adult court
jury trials (i.e., cases in which children have been transferred
' Fourteen states today have afforded juveniles the right to ajury trial. Joseph B.
Sanborn,Jr., The Right to a Public Juty Trial: A Need for Today 'sJuvenile, 76 JUDICATURE
230, 233 (1993). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-501 (West Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1656 (1986) (jury trial at court's discretion); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN.
ch. 119, § 55A (West 1993); MICH. COM. LAws ANN. § 712A.17(2) (West 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521(1) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16(A) (Michie
1995) (prior to this legislation, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled in Peyton v.
Nord, 437 P.2d 716 (N.M. 1968), that juveniles have the right to jury); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1110 (West 1987); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(c) (West Supp. 1995);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.31(2) (West 1987); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 14-6-223(c) (Michie 1994); R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971)
(holding that child acquires right to jury under state constitution).
", Several jury studies have concluded that adult juries find children's testimony
less credible than adults' because of skepticism over the children's ability to accu-
rately observe and recall events. See, e.g., Michael R. Leippe et al., Discernibility orDis-
crimination?: Undestanding jurors' Reactions to Accurate and Inaccurate Child and Adult
Eyewitness, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WrNESSES: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING
TESTIMONY 169 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993).
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from juvenile court) know that our clients have little compre-
hension of the process. 2 They are wooden in their responses to
juries. They are paralyzed. How can we expect children to re-
act to juries other than in terror and panic? And what effect
does their state of mind and their demeanor have upon the ju-
ries who judge them?
3
Jury trials that are not modified to take into account the
special needs of children will also impair the ability of children
to tell their stories. Anyone who has defended a child in crimi-
nal court knows that putting a child on the stand in that setting
is often unwise. 4 Children who are defendants in adult criminal
proceedings rarely make good witnesses. And their testimony is
often made even less credible by the aggressiveness of cross-
examinations that are likely to occur in the criminal court set-
ting. A child cross-examined by a skilled adversary is unlikely to
survive the battle of credibility.
Admittedly, cross-examinations of children in juvenile court
can be just as aggressive, mean spirited, and abusive as cross-
examinations of children in criminal court; prosecutors and de-
fense lawyers in juvenile court are often as aggressive as their
adult court counterparts. However, in a properly supervised,
staffed, and animated juvenile court, this kind of conduct could
be kept to a minimum-utilized only where necessary to under-
score gross and willful failure to adhere to the oath. A properly
trained, sensitive, and fair-minded juvenile court judge should
never permit a prosecutor or a defense lawyer to take advantage
of a child witness's fear or openness to suggestion.
"2Admittedly, my evidence to support the assessment of a child client's reactions to
a criminal court jury trial is anecdotal. And, admittedly, many of the adults I have
represented have demonstrated the same reactions to juries.
" I have not been able to find any studies which have discussed the impact of child
defendants upon the jury decision-making process. This is a point that seems to be
overlooked by those who argue that juveniles should be given the right to ajury trial.
See, e.g., Susan Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Bar on Jury Trials for Juveniles in the District
of Columbia, 33 U. Louisvl.=EJ. FAM. L. 875 (1994); Feld, supra note 1. I do not mean,
however, to suggest thatjury trials should not be made available in the juvenile court.
To the contrary, they should be made available but adapted to the capacities of chil-
dren. Cf Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Lawgiver: Child Clients' Competence in Context,
64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1473 (1996) (discussing children's competency in the context of
representation by attorneys).
8 For techniques to consider in preparing the client if the client indeed does take
the stand, see Karen J. Saywitz & Lynn Snyder, Improving Children's Testimony with
Preparation, in CHLD VIcnMS, CHiLDWinssES, supra note 83, at 117.
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We cannot begin to imagine the reactions that children
must have to the race and class differences between them and
the criminal court juries. A "flexible" system would allow a
judge to take creative measures to make the proceeding less ter-
rifying for the child. These measures could include special ex-
planations to the child, and selecting and de-selecting jurors
based upon behaviors which might demonstrate hostility toward
or dislike of children.
How might the jury trial process be more suitable for chil-
dren in a juvenile court than it would be in an adult criminal
court? Ideas worth taking into consideration include less formal
courtrooms, restructured jury selection processes, re-written
jury instructions, and a less adversarial-than-normal interaction
between all of the actors in the courtroom.
F. THE LEGAL CULTURE OF CRIMINAL COURTS WILL DAMAGE
CHILDREN
The adult criminal court's law practice culture would also
do great damage to children, where the culture of law practice
is characterized by combativeness. Prosecutors in adult court
are likely to bring to the courtroom a harder edge to jury trials
in adult court than injury trials in juvenile court because prose-
cutors in adult court are judged by their superiors on their suc-
cess in obtaining convictions.s The phenomenon of a "harder
edge" includes a greater degree of aggressiveness, of inflexibil-
ity, and retributivist motivation. Those of us who practice in
adult court know that as adversarial as some juvenile proceed-
ings are, the degree of adversariness in criminal court often far
exceeds the contentiousness found juvenile court. In juvenile
courts, it is at least more likely that prosecutors are committed
to the mission of protecting the public and fashioning balanced
dispositions which serve the best interests of children. Moreo-
ver, judges in juvenile courts may be more vigilant in protecting
juveniles from the retributionist leanings of prosecutors.6
Professor Rosenberg's description of adult criminal courts is apt: "for the most
part, the typical criminal court in urban areas is a harsh, tough, mean institution
cranking out pleas. It is not place for an adult defendant to be, much less a child....
Let's face it. As bad as the juvenile courts are the criminal courts are worse." Rosen-
berg, supra note 1, at 174.
The American Bar Association JuvenileJustice Standards Relating to Prosecution
state in Rule 1.4 that "[]uvenile prosecutors should take an active role in their corn-
1997]
THOMAS F. GERAGHTY
The behavior of the lawyers who represent children in
criminal court will also be more contentious. The very envi-
ronment of the criminal courtroom will generate and make
necessary this attitude on the part of lawyers who represent
children. If the prosecutor in the adult court views the child as
an adult, the defense lawyer must respond in kind. This means
submitting to the unfortunate reality that ajury trial involving a
child defendant is no different than one involving an adult de-
fendant.
How will the level of conflict inherent in adult court jury
trials be different from the level of such conflict in juvenile
court jury trials? What consequences will likely flow from
heightened adversariness and formality? Because of the num-
ber of children's cases that have been transferred to adult court
in recent years, there are an increasing number of lawyers who
have extensive experience in representing young children in
adult court in jury trial settings. Before moving all children
charged with crimes to adult court, we should learn from the
experience of those who try cases in juvenile and criminal
courts.
G. PLEA BARGAINING IN ADULT COURTWILL BE UNFAIR TO
CHILDREN
Many of the children I represent in criminal court do not
understand the consequences of the decision to go to trial or to
accept a negotiated plea bargain. This is particularly true when
children are asked to make the choice between pleading guilty
and accepting a lengthy prison sentence, and going to trial.
They have little ability to gauge the probability of a conviction
and cannot comprehend the impact of a short or lengthy sen-
tence upon their lives.
In criminal courts where defendants are penalized at sen-
tencing for asserting the right to trial by jury, young people may
receive longer sentences just because they have asked for a jury
trial.87 Such a result seems unfair in adult proceedings and
munity in preventing delinquency and protecting the rights of juveniles." JUVENILE
JuSTncE STANDARDS, supra note 36, at 263.87 Although imposing a penalty for exercising the right to jury trial is impermissi-
ble, it is permissible to impose a tax for refusing a plea offer. See Borderkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Corbitt v. NewJersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978). In reality, the
penalty for rejecting a plea offer is often difficult to distinguish from a penalty im-
posed because a defendant demands ajury.
[Vol. 88
JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN
doubly so in proceedings involving children. But the phe-
nomenon of punishment for assertion of the right to a jury trial
will inevitably occur in jury trials in adult criminal court involv-
ing children. In a properly supervised juvenile court, this form
of retribution could be held to a minimum. Juveniles should
not be expected to comprehend the informal rule of law that
holds that a criminal defendant can be expected to pay a "tax"
for assertion of his jury trial right. While we might tolerate such
an informal "tax" for adults, we cannot tolerate it for children
who have no comprehension of the risks and benefits of the
,,tax.$
H. SENTENCES IN ADULT COURT WILL BE TOO HARSH AND THE
FOCUS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OFYOUTH-ORIENTED
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS WILL BE ABANDONED
Children will face harsher penalties in adult court than in
juvenile court. The solution of a "youth discount"M may impose
some flexibility and rationality upon sentencing decisions.
However, in light of the complaints about the inflexibility of the
federal sentencing guidelines,9 and other mandatory sentenc-
ing schemes, we should think long and hard before imposing a
similarly rigid system upon children who arguably could benefit
from well-informed flexibility in sentencing. The perceived,
and some times real, need to provide long-term incarceration
for the small minority of children who must be institutionalized
could be satisfied by the "blended sentencing" schemes. 90 Un-
der these provisions, children receive both a juvenile and an
adult sentence in juvenile court. Based upon their responsive-
ness to programming within the juvenile system, they are evalu-
ated" to determine whether they will be released after their
juvenile sentence or whether they should serve out an adult sen-
tence. This decision is made based upon the experience with
the child of the juvenile correctional system over a lengthy pe-
riod of time. It is thus a better informed decision regarding
prognosis for treatment and protection of the public than the
automatic and ill-informed decision that is made in the context
of adult protection initiated by an automatic transfer. We
should question whether we have solved the problem of too
SeeFeld, supra note 1, at 70, 115-31.
8' See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
® See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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much judicial discretion in the juvenile system by utilizing a
"youth discount" which would not take into consideration the
individual characteristics of the children newly subject to the
adult jurisdiction. 9 The fact that there are inevitably some irra-
tional distinctions made between sentences children receive in
juvenile court should not compel us to move to a system in
which inflexible decision making is mandated.
I. ADULT COURTJUDGES, PROSECUTORS, AND DEFENDERS WILL
NOT BE CHILD SPECIALISTS
Other objections to trying children in adult court may be
even more substantial. Personnel in adult court-judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, probation officers, custodial work-
ers-are unlikely to receive the training necessary to sensitize
them to the special needs of children. There is no reason to
think that in a criminal system more resources would be de-
voted to juvenile than to adult probation services. There is
every reason to believe that just the opposite will occur. In
many jurisdictions, probation officers assigned to juvenile cases
have lighter caseloads and are more highly motivated to secure
rehabilitative services than their counterparts in adult court.93
Again, it is unlikely that in a criminal court setting specialized
and effective approaches to developing and supporting the
competencies of children and families will develop. Indeed,
quite the opposite may occur. Placing children in adult court
will make them indistinguishable from adults and may lead to
the stifling of initiatives and learning.
9See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the potentials and complexities of the inter-disciplinary cul-
ture ofjuvenile courts, see Frank P. Cervone & Linda Mauro, Ethics, Cultures, and Pro-
fessions in the Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1987 (1996):
[L]egal interests of children are intertwined with their social and psychological
interest. How to resolve which interest is more important at a particular point in
time is unclear. What is clear is that child advocacy takes place in the context of
relationships-that is, between the client and the professionals and between the
professionals themselves. Professionals need to respect each other and work to-
gether to arrive at meaningful decisions.
9' The Cook County Probation Department demonstrates that this is true in Chi-
cago. JUVENILE DIVISION, COOK COUNTY PROBATION DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE




VI. How CAN WE REINVIGORATEJUVENILE COURTS?
Legislators will make decisions about the future of juvenile
justice. Legislators are free to construct systems for providing
justice for children which contain the best of the ideas from
scholars such as Morse, Feld, Scott and Grisso and from other
experts, including judges, lawyers, social workers, doctors, and
correctional officials. However, recent trends suggest that legis-
lators rely more on public opinion than information as their
guide. There is also substantial evidence that legislators use "get
tough" messages to win re-election. In fact, recent juvenile jus-
tice legislation has been enacted in Illinois in response to par-
ticularly notorious cases, instead of on the actual data regarding
crime trends and the newest learning about successful interac-
94tions. Unfortunately, there is little that lawyers who represent
children can do to influence this unfortunate political process.
It should be noted, however, that Professor Feld's involvement
in Minnesota's juvenile justice reform provides a model for posi-
tive interactions between the world of academics and the world
of politics.
Putting the political process aside and turning to the merits,
what would be the nature of a constructive compromise? How
can we satisfy the need for more appropriate sentencing, recog-
nition of consequences, the need for more procedural protec-
tion, and the need to develop and to utilize new ways of
supporting and rehabilitating children? The answer, and admit-
tedly a very general one, is that juvenile courts must preserve
individualized decision-making with respect to the culpability
and developmental needs of children, while insisting on appro-
priate imposition of responsibility. Post-disposition, we must de-
velop ways of moving away from institutionalized "treatment" of
children to community-based programs designed to support
See, e.g., Johnathan Eig, Under Age: Frustrated Public Ready to Prosecute Children as
Adults, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Nov. 6, 1994, at 1J (concerning the two prepubescent
boys who murdered five-year-old Eric Morse); Gibbs, supra note 62 (concerning the
case of 11-year-old Yummy Sandifer); John Kifner, Three Teen-Agers Held in Killings of
Two in Brooklyn and Queens, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1994, at A21 (three 15-year-olds mur-
dered two people); Lynette Holloway, Four Youths Arrested in Killing of Bicyclist in Park,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1993, at A23 (two 14-year-olds and two 16-year-olds arrested for
shooting a drama teacher to steal his bicycle); Elizabeth Neuffer, Detention v. Incarcera-
tion: Rise in Murders Renews Call to Classify Youths as Adults, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23,
1990, at Al (rape by five juveniles and three adults).
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children and families and to build self-esteem and competen-
95cies.
The juvenile court must be transformed in a way that per-
mits and indeed requires children to be treated as our autono-
mous and individual children, and which provides for the
public safety. This requires changes in the ways that juvenile
courts adjudicate and dispose of cases. It requires a reorganiza-
tion of services for children so that the interests of children-
not those of institutions or agencies-prevail.
A. WE MUST LEARN FROM HISTORY THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE
BROUGHT THE JUVENILE COURT TO ITS WEAKENED AND
DIMINISHED AUTHORITY, AND THESE PROBLEMS MUST BE
RECOGNIZED AND ADDRESSED
Any attempt to bring together those who argue that the ju-
venile court should be abolished and those who believe that it
should be invigorated and preserved must address the concerns
of those who seek the juvenile court's abolition. For example,
Professor Feld argues that the juvenile court is still the "worst of
both worlds;" it punishes without procedural protections, and it
offers no treatment in exchange for forfeiture of rights.9
Many juvenile courts, perhaps most, are subject to this criti-
cism. But is the answer to this criticism to abolish the court?
Professor Feld's proposal has a rational basis, especially in light
of the fact that the juvenile court still hasn't got it right after
almost 100 years of existence. The proposal is flawed, however,
because it fails to take into account ideas which could make an
essentially good idea-a highly functioning special court for
children-a reality.
1. There Has Never Been a Dedicated, Concerted Effort to
Create and Support Excellent Juvenile Courts
The historical evidence demonstrates that even from the
beginning, we have failed both to create and to sustain excellent
juvenile courts. Only one judge presided over the first juvenile
court. Thatjudge had few resources;97 there was a well-founded
" See Holland & Myleniec, supra note 30, at 1835.
9Feld, supra note 1, at 92, 97.
17 See Tanenhaus, supra note 17, at 140 ("The [1899] Juvenile Court Act did not...
provide Judge Tuthill [the presiding Judge of the Cook CountyJuvenile Court] with
the resources to put this new philosophy of governance into practice because all the
funding provisions had been cut from the legislation"). Lucy Flowers, one of the
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worry even then that paying probation officers with government
funds would result in a patronage-driven system.98 Indeed it is
remarkable how soon after the founding of the juvenile court
the same shortcomings that concern us today surfaced. The
one judge assigned to the court had too many cases, so a
mechanism for "screening" cases was established.9 Judge Mack,
the second presiding judge of the juvenile court, was transferred
from the juvenile court because he became angered at the prac-
tice of congregate care institutions of releasing, without notice
to him, children he had committed. 0 In response to that prac-
tice, he placed more children on probation so that he could
personally supervise them.101 He was transferred to criminal
court as a result of the political outcry that resulted.0 2 He was
the first juvenile court judge to express frustration with child
care agencies. The tactic that he employed to address the prob-
lem-less reliance on institutionalization-earned him the
equivalent of the modem day label "soft on crime."
The due process revolution after Gault marked the begin-
ning of the second imperfect experiment. Juvenile courts be-
came populated by lawyers and judges in order to staff the
adversarial system mandated by the commands of due process.
Not all of these lawyers and judges sought assignments to juve-
nile courts. In Chicago, for example, between 1968 and roughly
1994, although there were many dedicated judges and lawyers
who sought careers in juvenile court, most lawyers and judges
assigned to the court did not want to be there. In Chicago, ju-
venile court judges and lawyers who worked in the juvenile
court were also programmed for failure by a cynical political
machine that viewed the court system as a patronage haven. 3
court's founders, obtained private funds to pay the salaries of probation officers and






103 In the late 1980s, the federal Operation Greylord investigation resulted in the
conviction of 31 Chicago lawyers and eight Cook County judges who routinely offered
and accepted bribes to fix cases ranging from traffic citations to death sentences dur-
ing a 20-year period. The chairman of the 43-member Special Committee on the
Administration of Justice established in 1984 to oversee the Cook County Circuit
Court, attorneyJerold Solovy, commented that
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Chicago's history is particularly embarrassing when it comes
to the administration and staffing of its court system.1°4 The un-
dermining of the juvenile court that occurred in Chicago, par-
ticularly after the Gault due process revolution, may not be
typical of what went on in juvenile courts around the country.
In jurisdictions with smaller court systems and less political in-
fluence, juvenile courts only had to struggle with the lack of re-
sources and inability to obtain meaningful services for children.
2. In Many Juvenile Courts the Quality of Adjudication is Poor
a. There is not enough attention paid to accurate fact-finding
during adjudicatory hearings.
The adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding is not
taken seriously enough; there is not enough attention paid to
accurate fact-finding. There are a number of reasons for this.
Children are discouraged by the judge, by the prosecutors and
by defense lawyers from taking their cases to trial. The ethic in
juvenile courts is still that confession (or admission) is good for
the soul, although it is difficult to know whether the best inter-
ests of the children or heavy caseloads lie at the heart of the ju-
venile court's failure to be careful about the facts. High
caseloads pressure children, prosecutors, defense lawyers and
judges to gloss over relevant facts, to ignore possible, defenses,
and to avoid the kind of attention to detail that makes for accu-
rate determinations of fact.
b. There is too much reliance on plea bargaining in juvenile
courts
There is too much reliance on plea bargaining without ade-
quate consultation with the client and without adequate super-
the corruption exposed by the Greylord investigation was comprised of more
than isolated, individual acts of greed. The corruption was organized and sys-
tematic.... The failure of so many to speak out about the endemic corruption..
. occurred (1) because of misplaced societal values that call keeping mum "loy-
alty" or "being a good boy" and (2) because lawyers have forgotten and have not
had the courage to fulfill their ethical obligations.





vision by judges. When a child is told to choose between going
to trial and risking incarceration, versus pleading guilty to a
lesser charge in return for probation, the deal is almost impos-
sible to resist. Unless handled properly, a child's response to
such an offer after plea bargaining may not be voluntary.
Reliance on plea bargaining is a necessary evil in our over-
crowded courts. Indeed, the practice is often salutary. It injects
much needed flexibility and responsiveness into the system.
The plea bargaining process often provides the only opportu-
nity for reasoned discussion between all of the decision-
makers-judge, prosecutor, defense lawyer, probation officer-
about all of the facts. However, in juvenile court, plea
bargaining can have a particularly destructive impact. Children
may be naturally good negotiators, but they are not
sophisticated enough to understand the various forces that
bring the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense lawyer to the
bargaining table. Is the negotiation taking place to save the
system and the adults' time and money, or is the being held to
advance the child's interests? Is the child brought into the
process and made to understand how the negotiation is meant
to further his or her interests? How are the alternatives that
negotiation produces explained to child clients? Is pressure
applied to encourage children to plead guilty?
Plea bargaining also fosters cynicism. The child who is not
guilty and who pleads to something that he did not do under
the threat of a harsh or penalty will not leave court impressed
with the integrity of the system. The child who is offered a bet-
ter deal than he should be offered feels that he has beaten the
system. We should worry about these same phenomena when
evaluating plea bargaining in the context of our adult criminal
justice system. However, the deficits of plea bargaining seem
even more pronounced when we involve children in it unless we
are especially sensitive to how the bargaining is conducted and
how the child is brought into the process.
c. The quality ofjudging, lawyering, and social work in juvenile
courts must be improved
1997] 233
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The quality of judging, lawyering, and social work in juve-
nile courts is too low.'05 The most pervasive cause of the low
quality of juvenile court personnel is that many of the people
who work in juvenile court do not want to be there. Advocates
for children, be they prosecutors or defense lawyers, repeatedly
have their efforts undermined by inefficient, ill-informed, or
downright hostile judges. Judges who want to make a difference
find themselves hamstrung by lawyers and child welfare person-
nel who are not as knowledgeable or as committed as they
should be.
3. There is Little Centralized Knowledge in Juvenile Courts Concerning the
Availability and Payment Options for Post-Dispositional Services
If there are good programs for children who need post-
dispositional services, there is little centralized knowledge re-
garding their existence and/or how to pay for them. In Cook
County, Illinois, for example, there are only a few people in ju-
venile court who are knowledgeable about programming for de-
linquent youth and what resources exist to fund such programs.
However, the information is not routinely distributed to judges,
to prosecutors, or to public defenders.
Once good post-dispositional programs are identified, the
process for getting children into those programs is Byzantine.
Funding sources for each program are different. The number
of different kinds of orders that must be obtained, the various
personnel who must be contacted, and the myriad of local,
state, and federal regulations that must be taken into account
during a search for services means that effective representation
of a child at this stage of the proceedings requires specialization
in the law of placement. Few legal services organizations have
recognized this fact, and few lawyers have the resources to cope
effectively with the placement bureaucracy.
If a child is in the system, the juvenile court usually has no
control over the quality of the program to which the child is as-
signed. This is often where the parens patriae model breaks
down. After disposition, the parent (the court) often has no
supervisory control over the services that are provided for the
"' A CAIL FORJUSTIcE, supra note 55, at 27 ("in some courts, attorneys are subtly
reminded by the court, the prosecutor, and other court personnel that zealous advo-
cacy is considered inappropriate and counter productive").
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child. In Illinois, for example, the separation of powers doc-
trine has been interpreted to mean that a juvenile court judge
has no power to monitor the State Department of Corrections'
treatment of a ward of the court.06 It is remarkable that ajuve-
nile court can hold a parent responsible for the treatment of
her children but cannot hold a state agency to whom a child is
committed by the court as parent to the same standard. There
are, of course, good reasons for being wary about judicial inter-
vention in correctional and treatment programs. Judges could
make nuisances of themselves. However, juvenile treatment and
correctional facilities are unlikely to perform well without the
oversight of an independent ombudsman. The children in
their care are, after all, powerless.
VII. A PARTIAL SOLUTION: THE PRACTITIONER'S
CHILD-CENTERED Focus
Without focusing on how proposals to alter existing sys-
tems would affect individuals, the debate about the future ofju-
venile justice ignores a necessary "child centered" focus. This
"child centered" focus should animate the conduct of all who
work in juvenile courts: prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges,
and probation officers.0 7 It is a focus shared by many who work
in juvenile court.
Information about the quality of the interaction between
children and families and the juvenile justice system cannot be
gleaned from statistics alone. By "quality of the interaction," I
mean an assessment of the value and efficacy of the intervention
to the child and to society. This subjective information comes
from familiarity with the experience of representing a client, the
experience of prosecuting a child, and from the experience of
investigating the social histories of children. This "experienced
based" assessment of the "quality of the interaction" is clinical,
not theoretical, and offers valuable perspectives to those who
grapple with the moral underpinnings of existing juvenile jus-
tice systems or whose aim is to create a procedurally and con-
ceptually more consistent approach to juvenile justice.
Is there consensus among reflective lawyers who work in ju-
venile courts about the efficacy of existing juvenile justice sys-
,o' SeePeople v.J.S., 469 N.E.2d 1090, 1095 (Ill. 1984).
107 SeeJuVENILEJUSTIcE STANDARDS, supra note 36, at 1.
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tems as compared to the adult criminal justice system? I believe
there is. Most lawyers who represent children subject to transfer
procedures fight hard to keep their clients out of adult court.
Why? The fight is notjust to evade the state's effort to seek pun-
ishment and responsibility. The fight is not just over who will
win or who will lose a case. Though the duty to represent a cli-
ent zealously dictates that we follow the directives of our clients
and attempt to minimize the adverse impacts of state interven-
tion, we are also motivated in our representation of children by
a more emotional response to our clients. We get to know our
clients.0 8
Through the process of getting to know our clients, we be-
gin to understand the complexity of the forces which have
brought our clients to the juvenile court (or to adult criminal
court if they are transferred there). We learn that the forces
which produced a violent act are a combination of external and
internal factors. More often than not, the external forces (e.g.,
poverty, child abuse, substance abuse) are factors that our cli-
ents did not create and for which they are in no way responsi-
ble.
Lawyers who represent children also learn that in the vast
majority of cases, sustained treatment interventions stand a very
good chance of achieving positive results. The problem is al-
ways how to find these services, how to identify the providers
who are truly skillful, and how to pay for the services. These in-
terventions include the involvement of skilled social workers,
specialized educational services, and more structured, residen-
tial treatment programs in special schools or psychiatric hospi-
tals.1' 9
The social workers and doctors who consult with us on our
cases tell us that they could design programs for our clients that
would probably reduce the likelihood of re-offending. They
also tell us that such programs are not available unless our cli-
" I recognize that many lawyers who represent clients in juvenile court may not
get to know their clients very well. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Im-
pediments to knowing clients include high caseloads and cultural differences be-
tween lawyers and clients. Systems must be developed in defender offices to
surmount this problem. This means fewer cases per lawyer and a greater degree of
assistance from those with the skills to understand children.
"I take seriously the observations of Holland and Myleniec regarding the overuse
of the concept of "treatment" and the failures of large systems to support the devel-
opment of children in crisis. Holland & Myleniac, supra note 30, at 1793.
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ents are able to pay for them. None of our young clients and
very few of their families can afford to pay. Of course, if our
own children were similarly at risk, such resources would be
found for them.
Reliance on so-called "state of the art" programming may
not be the most important or powerful potential of the juvenile
court. Hope for the juvenile court may have less to do with the
belief that thoughtful, well organized and well-intentioned pro-
grams can work and more to do with the juvenile court's under-
lying philosophy of hope. The ethic of the juvenile court is to
support children through adolescence as they mature out of
patterns of impulsive behavior. Sending children to adult court
destroys this ethic of hope and patience.
These observations underscore two important points. First,
many of the decisions that we are now making about the future
ofjuvenile justice are being made because we recognize that the
high quality individualized services that we would find for our
own children if they were at risk cannot be made available utiliz-
ing current state-funded service delivery systems. Second, legis-
lators are unwilling to fund programs that could work.
I do not mean to suggest that the proposals offered by Pro-
fessors Feld and Morse rest on the proposition that service de-
livery systems within the juvenile justice system are incompe-
tently organized or that they have given up on convincing legis-
lators to provide funding for state-of-the-art treatment programs
for troubled youth. However, if we had in place programs that
were thoughtful, efficient, and effective, the rationales for abol-
ishing the juvenile court would be far less powerful to the public
and to the legislators who must inevitably chart the future
course ofjuvenile justice policy.
VIII. SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OFJUVENILE COURTS: ESTABLISHING
REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS, MEETING REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
A. ESTABLISHING REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
The juvenile court is in jeopardy not because it has failed,
but because it has been unable, in a relatively short period of
time, to respond to new realities of children. However, the ex-
pectation that a court should have immediate solutions to in-
creased violence among youth is simply wrong-headed. We do
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not expect courts to solve social problems. We do expect courts
to be fair, efficient, and just.
Juvenile courts should no more be expected to solve the
problem ofjuvenile crime than the criminal courts are expected
to solve the problem of adult crime. This may mean that juve-
nile courts could play a role in reducing crime rates, but that
role will probably be relatively insignificant. What juvenile
courts will do with effective interventions is to keep the rate of
recidivism relatively low when compared to the performance of
criminal court-corrections systems. There is substantial evi-
dence to support the proposition that juvenile courts and asso-
ciated treatment and correctional systems have proved them-
selves to be more effective at preventing recidivism than have
adult court and penal systems. °10 This reality must be taken into
account when deciding how many young people should be de-
prived of the services which the juvenile justice system is rela-
tively good at delivering.
B. MEETING REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
What should juvenile courts be expected to accomplish in
order to satisfy those who are skeptical about their continuing
utility?
1. Juvenile Courts Should Provide Fair, Impartial, and
Informed Adjudications and Dispositions of Cases
First, juvenile courts should have as their hallmark the fair,
impartial, and informed adjudication and disposition of cases.
This means that juvenile court judges must hold the state to the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that excessive
plea bargaining in order to deal with case backlogs should be
eliminated, and that judges and lawyers in juvenile court be
specially trained to recognize the educational, social, and treat-
ment needs of children and families in crisis. It is no longer
enough, and it probably never was enough, that judges have a
sincere desire to help children. Thus, judges must be general-
ists in the sense that they know how a case should be tried and
specialists in their knowledge of juvenile law and procedure,
child development, and treatment strategies.
11' See supra notes 35, 43 and accompanying text.
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2. Lawyers in Juvenile Courts Must Be Both Generalists and Specialists
We also need generalists and specialists in the corps of law-
yers who prosecute and defend juvenile delinquency cases; gen-
eralists in the sense that they have a broad range of lawyering
skills and specialists in dealing with children, families, and
treatment providers. That corps of highly qualified generalists
and specialists has never existed in juvenile court; it is as though
we have been trying to run a children's hospital without a staff
of pediatricians. For the most part, those who prosecute and
defend juvenile cases do so only for a short period of time and
move on. Juvenile court is a training ground for them, nothing
more. Juvenile courts cannot possibly succeed without a level of
professionalism and experience that we would require for any
important endeavor. We have never been serious about organiz-
ing, funding, and staffing juvenile courts.
3. Treatment and Rehabilitation Services Must Function Properly
Moving beyond the court, probation services, residential
programs, and correctional programs must function properly if
the juvenile court is to succeed. In most jurisdictions, these
services are far from state-of-the-art. The failures of these insti-
tutions undermine the court's work and its public image. The
failures of treatment/rehabilitation services rarely come back to
haunt those who are providing the services. They often come
back to haunt the juvenile court judge who took the risk of
sending a child for treatment rather than long-term incarcera-
tion and incapacitation. No treatment/correctional system can
guarantee success. However, increased focus on improving the
quality of interventions will make juvenile courts viable.
An effective strategy for preserving and strengthening juve-
nile courts can only be built upon investing in the people who
serve children in juvenile courts and in public and private child
service organizations. The best interests of children and the
protection of the public will ultimately not be achieved by rest-
ing decision-making regarding the future of juvenile justice on
the wholesale reorganization of existing systems or upon re-
thinking the question of the extent to which children should be
held to be as responsible as adults.
The key question is how to deliver legal and social services
to children fairly, efficiently, and effectively. This is, indeed a
"systems" problem. Systems problems are relatively easy to
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solve. Just change the system. But the more important problem
is how to motivate the people who work within the system to
turn out the best possible product. This problem will exist if
children are treated as fully responsible adults, it will exist if the
juvenile court is abolished, and it will exist if we seek to save the
juvenile court by understanding more deeply the delinquent
behaviors of children and adolescents.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article began with a case study describing the interaction
between a young person charged with serious crimes, his lawyers,
and the juvenile court. The case study was meant to set the stage
for the discussion that followed about the realities of juvenile
crime statistics and the capabilities and role of juvenile courts.
Since writing the introduction to this article, an even more dis-
tressing crime was allegedly committed by an even younger child
in Chicago. The newest case involves a twelve-year-old who alleg-
edly shot and killed two teenagers, allegedly in an effort to prove
his worthiness to older gang members. Interestingly, the reaction
of the press to this incident focused on causes and prevention
rather than amending legislation to make it possible to try this
child as an adult. The Chicago Sun-Times referred to this incident
as "Everyone's Problem.""' The Chicago Tribune described in detail
the social and educational history of the troubled child charged
with the crime.12 Again, rather than calling for this child to be
tried as an adult, at this writing, public opinion seems to be call-
ing for an effort to understand what produced this tragedy and
how to prevent such tragedies from occurring in the future.
Perhaps the reason for the measured and constructive reac-
tion to this latest awful event is the extreme youth of the child in-
volved and the uncontested fact that he acted seeking approval
from or following the instructions of older gang members. Per-
haps the reaction is the result of the fact that the reporters who
covered the story did much the same kind of investigation that
... Editorial, Eveyone's Probler, Cm. SUN-TimEs, Feb. 5, 1998, at 29:
Certainly, there are no easy answers here. And there is no one person or prob-
lem to blame. But that does not mean that juvenile violence and the prolifera-
tion of gangs are problems that cannot be stopped. At the risk of oversimplifying,
we note that everyone has a role to play in this drama.
"' A Life on a Collision Course, Cm. TRm., Feb. 5, 1998, at Al. The subtitle of this article
is Young Murder Suspect Fell to Gang's Lure.
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good lawyers would do on behalf of this child: they went into the
community, and interviewed family and friends of the child and
of the victims, interviewed the child's school teachers and neigh-
bors. What came out of this investigation was the story of a child's
life. It turned out to be a story of a broken home, a child lost to
gang culture despite the efforts of his family and school teachers,
and access to a snub-nosed .38 caliber gun. The story of this
child's life, like the story of the young man whose progress
through the juvenile court began this article, is the product of all
if its parts. Unless we focus our efforts on understanding these
stories, in a setting supportive of understanding, we are unlikely to
provide justice for children.
